

# REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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## Index

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## AFRICA — COUNTRIES AND PROBLEMS

Africa South of the Sahara — Dj. Jerković	—	—	141
The Contradictions in a Country's Policy — Dj. Jerković	—	—	144
Africa, Before and Now — Z. Štambuk	—	—	146
Two New Independent States — M. Bartoš	—	—	149
Prospects of Egypt's Development — R. Kesić	—	—	150
Algerian Themes — Jean Daniel	—	—	152/3
Algerian Themes — Jean Daniel	—	—	154
Problem of Consolidation in Tunisia and Morocco — D. K.	—	—	155

## AMERICA — COUNTRIES AND PROBLEMS

Eisenhower's State of the Union Message — S. Kovačević	—	139
The Economic Aspect of Eisenhower's Message — R. Stamenković	—	139
The Washington Talks — S. Kovačević	—	141
Racial discrimination in the USA — S. Kovačević	—	142
Eisenhower or Stevenson — R. Blum	—	154
After the US Elections — S. Kovačević	—	159
Eisenhower's Economic Policy — R. Stamenković	—	159

## ASIA — COUNTRIES AND PROBLEMS

The Sixth Anniversary of the Republic of India — R. Dayal	—	140
India in the Contemporary World — Dj. Jerković	—	140
Economic Development in Asia — V. Milenković	—	141
The Abolition of the Dutch — Indonesian Union — M. Bartoš	—	143/3
Tokyo and Moscow — Dj. Julius	—	155
The Problem of West Irian — P. Jevremović	—	157
China and Asia — R. P.	—	160

## COEXISTENCE

Coexistence — The Need of the Day — H. Beuve — Mery	—	146
Bases of Coexistence — J. Djordjević	—	152/3
International Division of Labour — N. Popović	—	155

## CULTURE AND ART

Modern Yugoslav Sculpture — A. Čelebonović	—	138
Commemoration of Josip Slavenski — A. Preger	—	139
Milan Artists in Belgrade — A. Čelebonović	—	139/40
The Art of Charlie Chaplin — Ljuba Radičević	—	140
The Reason For School Reform — J. Lukatela	—	141
Two Scientific Publications — V. Novak	—	141
The British Film Festival in Belgrade — Ranko B. Petković	—	142
A Yugoslav Institute of World Significance — V. Novak	—	143/4



Gramophone Records of Yugoslav Operas — A. Preger — — —	147
International Cultural Cooperation — B. Zihel — — —	148
Moscow Art Theatre Ensemble in Belgrade — Tanasije Mladenović — — —	148
Fruitful Cultural Cooperation — N. K. — — —	152/3
The Dubrovnik Summer Festival — A. Preger — — —	154
Meeting of Art Critics in Dubrovnik — A. Čelebonović — — —	156
The Virtuosity of David Oystrian — Pavle Stefanović — — —	157
Yugoslav Books in the World — A. — — —	157
Individual and Creative Freedom in Socialism — T. Mladenović — — —	161

#### EUROPE — COUNTRIES AND PROBLEMS

The Socialdemocrat Party and the Reunification of Germany H. Wehner — — —	138
After the French Elections — Dj. Jerković — — —	139
Undistributed Inheritance — J. Živić — — —	139
Two German Armies — J. Gustinčić — — —	140
New Perspectives of European Integration — J. Živić — — —	140
The First Retreat — Dj. Jerković — — —	141
Dilemmas of the German Social Democrats — J. Živić — — —	141
The Greek Elections — B. Dikić — — —	142
Erhard's Visit to London — D. Božić — — —	142
Political Upheavals in Western Germany — I. Živić — — —	142
Guy Mollet in London — Dj. Jerković — — —	143
Norway in World Affairs — H. Lange — — —	143/4
Economic Development and World Economy — V. Miljenković — — —	143/4
Small Europe in New Aspects — J. Živić — — —	145
Possibilities of European Cooperation — J. Gustinčić — — —	147
Holiday Mood or Something Else — H. Benecke — — —	148
Problem of Disarmament — A. Gromiko — — —	148
Cyprus in British Policy — J. Gustinčić — — —	150
Two Germanys and Their Unification — K. Tončić — — —	150
France and Euroatom — J. Živić — — —	151
Congress in Munich — K. Tončić — — —	151
Western Germany and Armament — S. Erlih — — —	152/3
The British Dilemma — B. Kićović — — —	154
The German Panorama — K. Tončić — — —	155
Diplomatic Gambits and Reality — K. Tončić — — —	157
The Poznan Epilogue — K. T. — — —	157
West European Cooperation — J. Živić — — —	157
Poland On a New Road — K. Tončić — — —	158
The Saar Agreement — K. Tončić — — —	158
German Barometers — S. Erlih — — —	158
The German Dilemma — J. Živić — — —	159
Intraeuropean Trade — Stane Pavlič — — —	159

Current Greek Policy — J. Gustinčić	160
Policy of Truth and Concessions — V. Djukić	160
Hungary After its Tragedy — Djuka Julius	160

## FOREIGN POLICY AND TRADE IN FPRY

Ways of Stabilization of France — S. Prica	138
Yugoslav Exports and Eastern Europe — M. Aleksić	138
Tito's Trip of Peace — M. Javorski	139
Yugoslavia's Economic Relations — S. Pavlič	140
Economic Agreement with US — M. Aleksić	140
The End of the Bonn Negotiation — P. Stojković	143/4
Agreements with Italy — S. Petrović	143/4
Two Visits	143/4
Franco—Yugoslav Friendship — Leo Hamon	145
The Same Love of Freedom and Justice — P. Mendes-Erance	146
Reason and Heart — A. Bebler	146
New Enthusiasm in Franco—Yugoslav Cooperation	146
To Be in the Right — J. Cassou	146
Yugoslavia and France in the Past — M. Bartoš	146
Franco—Yugoslav Friendship — A. Morel	146
After President Tito's Visit to France — M. Javorski	147
Economic Cooperation with France — M. Aleksić	147
A Significant Event — N. Firiubin	148
Yugoslav—Soviet Trade — M. Aleksić	148
In the Mission of Peace	149
Joint Yugoslav—Soviet Statement	149
Declaration on the Relation Between the Yugoslav CL and the Soviet CP	149
Yugoslav—Soviet Relations — V. Bakarić	149
President Tito's Speech	150
Joint Yugoslav—Rumanian Statement	150
Communique on Relations Between the LCY and the WPR	150
The Brioni Talks	151
The Educational Problem in Carinthia — K. Milenović	151
Brioni Document	152/3
Markets in the Near and Middle East — A. Partonić	152/3
New Agreements with Italy — B. Sambrailo	154
Yugoslavia and her Foreign Economic Partners — A. Partonić	154
Yugoslav — Indian Economic Relations — V. Mesarić	154
President Soekarno's Visit to Yugoslavia	155
Economic Survey — S. Petrović	155
Yugoslav — Indonesian Economic Relations — V. Mesarić	155
Franco — Yugoslav Cooperation — T. Vujasinović	155
The Significant Manifestations in Belgrade — Bonn Relations — K. Tončić	156



Events and Facts — S. Petrović	—	—	—	—	156
An Incomplete but Positive Measure — K. Točić	—	—	—	—	156
Economic Cooperation with Hungary — S. Pavlič	—	—	—	—	156
Facts and Events — S. Petrović	—	—	—	—	157
Yugoslavia and US AID — *. Kovačević	—	—	—	—	158
Facts and Events — S. Petrović	—	—	—	—	159
Friendship and Cooperation — Ph. Philon	—	—	—	—	160
Edvard Kardelj's Address in the Federal Peoples's Assembly	—	—	—	—	150
Yugoslavia and China — S. Pavlič	—	—	—	—	161
Confirmation of Friendship	—	—	—	—	161

#### INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

Two Years After the Geneva Conference — Dj. Jerković	—	—	—	—	141
Results of the Venice Conference — J. Arnejc	—	—	—	—	149

#### INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

Economic Assistance to Underdeveloped countries — B. Kičović	—	—	—	—	142
Exchange Controls — V. Majšner	—	—	—	—	156
Struggle for World Markets — V. Milenković	—	—	—	—	158
Struggle for Oil Intensifies — V. Milenković	—	—	—	—	160

#### INTERNAL POLICY AND ECONOMY

The Federal National Assembly of Last Year — V. Simić	—	—	—	—	128
The Committees of the Federal Peoples Assembly — J. Djordjević	—	—	—	—	138
The Aims of Yugoslav Economic Policy — L. Gligorov	—	—	—	—	140
New Features in the Yugoslav Political System — J. Djordjević	—	—	—	—	142
The Place and Role of State Administration — J. Djordjević	—	—	—	—	143/4
Organization of State Administration — J. Djordjević	—	—	—	—	145
Yugoslavia's Industrial Development — S. Vukmanović	—	—	—	—	146
Social and Health Policy in Yugoslavia — M. Marković	—	—	—	—	147
Democracy and Government Administrations — A. Vratuša	—	—	—	—	147
Human and Civil Rights in Socialism — J. Djordjević	—	—	—	—	148
Local Self-Government — J. Djordjević	—	—	—	—	150
Nikola Tesla — T. Lukić	—	—	—	—	151
The Permanent Conference of Towns — L. Geršković	—	—	—	—	157
Court Procedure in Civil Actions — M. Srzentić	—	—	—	—	157
Aluminium Industry Expansion in FPRY — S. Pavlič	—	—	—	—	157
Day of the Republic — P. Perović	—	—	—	—	160
The Assembly and Plan for 1957 — J. Davičo	—	—	—	—	161

#### INTERNATIONAL WORKERS MOVEMENT

The XX Congress of Soviet Party — Puniša Petrović	—	—	—	—	143
New Developments in the Workers's Movement — Z. Priklmajer	—	—	—	—	146

On the Eve of Italian Communist Party's Congress — M. K.	—	154
A Good Beginning — R. Kesić	— — — —	145
Cooperation Between Two Labour Movements — K. Tončič	—	156
Togliatti — Nenni — K. Tončič	— — — —	157
Congress of Chinese Communist Party — M. Marković	—	157
About a Protest in the French Communist Party — Z. Priklmajer	—	159
Asian Socialist Congress — J. Stanovnik	— — — —	160
FSP and Problems of International Socialism — Z. Priklmajer	—	160

#### NATO AND OTHER MILITARY PACTS

Change in pact conceptions — L. Erven	— — — —	138
The Bagdad Pact — L. Erven (I)	— — — —	141
The Bagdad Pact — L. Erven (II)	— — — —	145
The Bagdad Pact — L. Erven (III)	— — — —	145
The Bagdad Pact — L. Erven (IV)	— — — —	146
NATO Today — Djuka Julius	— — — —	147
Twilight of the NATO — L. Erven	— — — —	157

#### NEAR EAST AND SUEZ CRISIS

Responsibility and Indecision Dj. Jerković	— — — —	141
Notes on Cairo Talks — Dj. Jerković	— — — —	143
The Suez Crisis — J. Gustinčič	— — — —	154
Aggravation — N. Dubravčić	— — — —	155
The Suez Contradictions — L. Erven	— — — —	156
USA and the Suez Crisis — S. Kovačević	— — — —	157
The Procedure in the Suez Crisis — Z. Priklmajer	— — — —	157
Suez before the Security Council	— — — —	157
The Suez Canal Users Association — L. Erven	— — — —	158
Aggression Must Be Stopped	— — — —	158
The Arab World — P. Jevremović	— — — —	158
The Legal Aspect of the Aggression — M. Bartoš	— — — —	159
Fiasco of Aggression	— — — —	161
The USA in the Near East — L. Erven	— — — —	161

#### NUCLEAR ENERGY

Two Aspects of Atomic Physics — Charles Noel Martin	— —	138
Two Aspects of Atomic Physics — Charles Noel Martin (II)	— —	139
Atomic Energy and International Cooperation — J. Arnejc	—	141

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Good Start in London — Dj. Jerković	— — — —	143
A Welcome Change — Dj. Jerković	— — — —	143



New Facts — Dj. Jerković	—	—	—	—	14
In Face of New Dangers — J. Gustinčič	—	—	—	—	15

## UNO AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The UN Charter and the Colonial Problem — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	13
The UN and Regional Cooperation — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	14
The Disarmament Problem Before the UNO — J. Brilej	—	—	—	—	14
The Codification of Diplomatic Law — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	14
The International Atom Agency — J. Arnejc	—	—	—	—	14
A Welcome Change — Dj. Jerković	—	—	—	—	143/
Interparliamentary Union Session — V. Simić	—	—	—	—	14
Problem of Disarmament — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	14
European Economic Commission of OUN — R. Stamenković	—	—	—	—	14
International Agency for Nuclear Energy — J. Arnejc	—	—	—	—	14
Visits of Parliamentary Delegations — V. Simić	—	—	—	—	14
Some Legal and Political Aspects of Space — D. Janičijević	—	—	—	—	14
New Prospects of Disarmament — S. Kovačević	—	—	—	—	15
Steps Towards Disarmament — S. Kovačević	—	—	—	—	15
UNO in New International Situation — S. Makiedo	—	—	—	—	152/
International Law Association Congress — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	152/
After the Dubrovnik Congress — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	15
Conference in New-York — J. Arnejc	—	—	—	—	15
The Meeting in Geneva — V. Simić	—	—	—	—	15
Toward an International Atom Agency — S. Damjanović	—	—	—	—	15
Positive Prospects — J. Arnejc	—	—	—	—	15
UN General Assembly — F. Kos	—	—	—	—	15
The Collective Security System — L. Erven	—	—	—	—	15
The Admission of New Members to UNO — P. Bizjak	—	—	—	—	15
UN and Universality — — — —	—	—	—	—	15
Respect of International Obligations — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	16
UNO General Assembly Debate — F. Kos	—	—	—	—	16
USSR and Disarmament — N. Opačić	—	—	—	—	16
The Question of Revising the Charter — M. Bartoš	—	—	—	—	16
Interparliamentary Union Conference — V. Simić	—	—	—	—	16



# THE ADDRESS

DELIVERED BY JOSIP BROZ TITO, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA, ON NOVEMBER 11, 1956, BEFORE THE BODY OF ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS FROM ISTRIA AT THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY CLUB IN PULA\*

Josip Broz Tito, the Secretary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, recently delivered an address before the active communists of Istria in Pula. In his address Tito gave his views on the current political developments in the world with special reference to the events in Hungary, Poland and Egypt.

The Editorial Board of "International Politics" is issuing the full authentic text of that address so that its readers have the benefit of reading this address which has created large interest in the ranks of the world public.

YESTERDAY I expressed the desire to profit by my stay on the Brioni Islands, while I am undergoing medical treatment, to come before you and to present our views on the international problems which today are very tangled.

You read newspapers, but daily newspapers cannot present everything and illuminate events comprehensively, and particularly the causes of what is happening today in Hungary as well as in Egypt, where it came to the Israeli—French—British aggression. The situation today is considerably tangled and we cannot say that a certain danger does not exist of major conflicts developing, but the peace-loving forces in the world, among which our country also belongs, have demonstrated in the United Nations that with their persevering and indefatigable efforts they can reduce the possibility of international conflict and have already contributed to the hope that peace will still be preserved in the world.

Before all else I would like to deal with what is happening in Hungary today and what took place in Poland, so that we may have an accurate idea of those developments, which are very complicated, particularly in Hungary, where a large part of the working class and progressive people were fighting with arms in their hands on the streets against the Soviet armed forces. When the Hungarian workers and progressive elements began with demonstrations and next with their resistance and armed actions against the Rakossy methods and against the further prosecution of his policies. I am deeply convinced that one could not then speak of counter-revolutionary tendencies. One can say that it is regrettable and tragic that the reaction was able to find highly fertile soil there and to gradually divert matters into its own channels, taking advantage of the justified revolt which existed in Hungary for its own ends.

### THE ROOTS OF THE EVENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

You are in the main aware of the causes which led to the events in Poland and Hungary. It is necessary that we go back to the year 1948, when Yugoslavia was the first to give an energetic answer to Stalin and when she said that she desired to be independent, that she desired to build her life and socialism in accordance with the specific conditions in her country and that she would permit no one to interfere in her internal affairs. Of course it did not then come to an armed intervention, because Yugoslavia was already united. Due to the fact that we had liquidated their main force already during the course of the People's Liberation War, the various reactionary elements were not able to carry out provocations. Second, we had a very strong, unified and monolithic Communist Party, steered in both the prewar period and during the People's Liberation War. We also had a powerful and steered People's Army, and, most important of all we had the unity of our people personifying all this.

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\* Translation of the address as published in "Borba" of November 16, 1956.



Once the truth about our country had conquered and the period of normalization of relations with the countries which had severed relations with us after the ill-famed Cominform resolution has set in, the leaders of Eastern countries expressed the desire that we no longer mention things which had been done to us, that we let bygones be bygones. We accepted this proposal only to have the relations with those countries improved as soon as possible. But you will see later that it is indeed necessary to remind certain individuals who today again are beginning to vilify our country, and who stand at the head of communist parties in the Eastern countries, and even in certain Western countries, to remind them of what they had been doing against Yugoslavia during these last 4—5 years, and even longer, when Yugoslavia stood entirely alone face to face with their huge propaganda apparatus, when we had to struggle on all sides to preserve the achievements of our people's revolution, to preserve that which we already had started to build — the foundations of socialism — in one word to wipe off the disgrace which they had wanted to inflict upon us by sundry slanders and to prove where the real truth lay. We should remind them and state that these same men had then in all possible ways denounced our country saying that it was a fascist state, that we were blood-thirsty men and that we were destroying our people, that our working people were not with us, etc. We should warn them to remind themselves and keep this in mind today when they again desire to shift the blame for the events in Poland and Hungary into our shoulders. This perfidious tendency originates among those hard-bitten Stalinist elements who in various parties still manage to maintain themselves at their posts and who would again wish to consolidate their rule and impose those Stalinist tendencies upon their peoples, and even others I am going to return to this later. Just now I only wish to tell you that today we must view the events in Hungary in the light of that entire past development.

#### IT IS A QUESTION NOT ONLY OF CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BUT OF THE SYSTEM WHICH HAD MADE POSSIBLE THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

On its desire and initiative, we have normalized our relations with the Soviet Union. After Stalin died, the new Soviet leaders saw that, thanks to Stalin's foolishness, the Soviet Union had landed in a very difficult situation, in a blind alley, both where its foreign and internal policy is concerned, and, thanks to his domineering over and the forcing of his methods, created the same situation in other countries of people's democracy as well. The Soviet leaders grasped where lay the main cause of all those difficulties and at the Twentieth Congress of their party they condemned Stalin's acts and his policy up to then, but they mistakenly placed the whole matter as a question of cult of the individual, and not as a question of the system. And cult of the individual, in effect, is the product of a system. They did not join battle against that system, or in so far as they did they did so reticently, saying that on the whole everything had been all right but that of late, because Stalin had grown old, he had started to be a little foolish and to commit various mistakes.

From the very beginning we had been saying that here was not a question of the cult of individual alone, but of a system which had made possible the creation of the cult of the individual, that therein lay the roots of the matter, that this is what should be struck at incessantly and tenaciously, and this is the most difficult thing to do. Where are those roots? In the bureaucratic apparatus, in the method of leadership and the so-called „uniformity“ and in the ignoring of the role and aspirations of the working masses. The roots are in various Enver Hoxas and Shehus and among leaders of certain Western and Eastern parties who are resisting democratization and the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and who had contributed a great deal to the consolidation of Stalin's system itself, and who today are working to revive it so that it may continue its sway again. Therein lie the roots and this is what wants correcting.

## THE MOSCOW DECLARATION IS INTENDED FOR A WIDER CIRCLE OF COUNTRIES BESIDES YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

As far as we are concerned, we have gone a considerable way in the relations with the Soviet Union. We have improved these relations and have concluded a whole series of economic arrangements very useful for us, on very favourable terms, etc. Two declarations also had been adopted, one in Beograd and the other in Moscow. Both these declarations should actually have a significance not only for our mutual relations, but for the relations between all socialist countries. But, regrettably, they have not been thus grasped. It was being reasoned as follows: „good, since the Yugoslavs are so stubborn, we shall respect and implement those declarations, but they do not concern others. Because the situation there after all is a little different than in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is an organized and disciplined state. The Yugoslavs had demonstrated their worth for even in the most difficult hours they had succeeded in holding their own and did not permit restoration of the capitalist system, etc. to wit, they are something else than you in the Eastern countries are, where it is ourselves who had placed you in power...“ And this reasoning was wrong. Because those same elements, who in 1948 provoked such resistance of Yugoslavia still live in those eastern countries, in Poland, in Hungary and even elsewhere, somewhere more and somewhere less. At the time when we were formulating the declaration in Moscow on our party relations, mainly on the relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this was going with some difficulty. Here we could not completely agree, but even so a declaration was adopted which, in our opinion, was intended for a wider circle beyond Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We had been warning them that the tendencies which earlier had aroused such strong resistance in Yugoslavia existed in all countries and could some day manifest themselves in some other countries also, when this would be far more difficult to correct.

You know that Khrushchov was here for a rest. On that occasion we had conversations both here, even more in Beograd. Since Comrades Ranković and Pucar and I had been invited to Crimea we went there and continued the conversations. We saw that in respect to other countries the matter would go with some difficulty because the Soviet leaders have different attitudes toward other Eastern countries, since they share certain mistaken and defective views on their relations towards those countries, towards Poland, Hungary and others. But this we did not take so tragically, because we saw that this was not the attitude of the whole Soviet leadership, but only of one part, which to some degree had imposed this attitude upon the other part. We saw that this attitude had been imposed by those men who had generally stood, and still stand, on Stalinist positions, but that nevertheless there were possibilities that through inner evolution, those elements who were in favour of a more forceful and quicker development in the direction of democratization, of abandonment of all Stalinist methods and the creation of new relations between socialist states and that the development in this direction would also proceed in foreign policy, would win in the leadership in the Soviet Union. From certain signs and also from the conversations, we saw that those elements were not weak, that they were strong but that this inner process of development in a progressive direction, in the direction of abandoning the Stalinist methods, was being hampered also on the part of certain Western countries which, with their propaganda and incessant reiteration of the need for “the liberation” of those countries, are interfering in the internal affairs of those countries and hindering the rapid development and improvement of the relations between those countries. For the Soviet Union deems, in view of the fact that such interference in internal matters had assumed fairly wide proportions in propaganda on the radio, the sending of material by balloons, etc., that it could come to awkward consequences if they completely abandoned those countries and granted them, say, a status such as Yugoslavia has. They fear that in such countries it could then come to the victory of reactionary forces. In other words, this means that they have not enough confidence in the internal revolutionary forces of those countries. In my opinion, this is wrong and the root of all the subsequent mistakes lies in the insufficient confidence in the socialist forces of those peoples.

## OUR COUNTRY HAS BEEN ACTING VERY POSITIVELY AND USEFULLY

When it came to the Poznan incident, with which you are familiar, there occurred a sudden change of attitude towards us among the Soviet leaders. They started to grow colder. They thought that we, the Yugoslavs, were to blame for those events. Yes, we are to blame for being alive in this world, for being what we are, for having created a Yugoslavia such as she is, because her reality reverberates even beyond our country. Even if we did not desire it, our country still influences others, and that very positively and usefully. Thanks to the fact that there still remained in Poland, in spite of all persecutions and Stalinist methods of destruction of the leading personnel a hard core of leaders with Gomulka at their head, who at the Eighth Plenum of their party managed powerfully to take matters in their hands, to boldly put their stamp on the new course; that is, the course towards democratization, towards their full independence but also for good relations with the Soviet Union, to resolutely offer resistance to interference in their internal affairs — thanks to this, in Poland there did not come to the expression of the reactionary forces which certainly exist and which had hoped to come to the surface in a conflict among communists. Thanks to the mature reasoning and attitude of the Soviet leaders, who ceased to interfere at the right moment, matters in Poland have considerably stabilized themselves for now and are developing fairly well.

I cannot say that this positive development in Poland, which is very similar to ours, has met with much joy in the remaining countries of the "socialist camp". No, it is being criticised and rather stealthily and among themselves, but to some extent openly as well. Among these countries Poland did not meet even with as much support as she found among the Soviet leaders, who had agreed to the Polish position. Among those various leading personalities in some countries of the "socialist camp", and even among some communist parties in the West Poland did not meet with understanding because Stalinist elements are still in power in their parties.

When that would-be professor of history holds a lecture in France and says that Yugoslavia is a sly agent of imperialism, when men are sitting in the leadership of Communist Party of France, who at such a tragic and difficult moment of history, also make such grave accusation, before hundreds and hundreds of people, can this constitute a guarantee that the cause of socialism would develop correctly in the future? It cannot. For such excesses of such irresponsible and decadent elements, the leaders of that party are to blame. Or, for instance, when such a would-be Marxist as Enver Hoxha of Albania, who only knows how to utter the phrase, "Marxism-Leninism" and hardly a word more, writes an article about Yugoslavia, without naming her, but hitting out at her and Poland, in which he resolutely condemns the tendencies of each country's own path and development to socialism in accordance with the specific native conditions and even goes against that which Khrushchov and other Soviet leaders had recognized, namely that there exists different specific roads into socialism. Such persons have not only dared to vilify and rise against Yugoslavia and another great socialist country, but even to strike at the Soviet leaders themselves. Such Stalinist elements believe that leaders of the Stalinist brand will be found in the Soviet Union who would uphold them and help to maintain them on the back of their people. This, comrades, is fatal.

When we were in Moscow, of course, there was also talk of Poland and Hungary and other countries. We said that Rakossy's regime and Rakossy himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state and develop its inner unity, but on the contrary they could only bring about grave consequences. Unfortunately, the Soviet comrades did not believe us. They said that Rakossy was an old revolutionary, honest, etc. That he is old — this is granted, but that is not enough. That he is honest — this I could not confirm, as far as I know him, especially after the Rajk trial and all other things. To me, those in the Rakossy regime are the most dishonest people in the world. The Soviet comrades said that he was prudent, that he was going to succeed and that they knew of no one else whom they could rely upon in that



country. Just because our policy, both state and party policy, is opposed to interference in the internal affairs of other and so as not to come again into collision with the Soviet comrades, we did not engage ourselves sufficiently with the Soviet leaders to have the Rakossy and Goere combination eliminated.

### GOERE DIFFERED IN NO WAY FROM RAKOSSY

When I went to Moscow, there was great surprise expressed why I did not travel over Hungary. It was precisely because of Rakossy that I did not want to do so. I said that I would not go through Hungary even if it would have meant making the journey three times shorter. When there appeared greater and greater dissatisfaction among the communist ranks themselves in Hungary and when they demanded that Rakossy should be removed the Soviet comrades realized that things could not go on like that and agreed that he should be removed. However, they made the mistake of not allowing the removal of Goere and other Rakossy followers also who had compromised themselves in the eyes of the Hungarian people. The Soviet leaders made it a condition that Goere should remain when Rakossy was removed. And this was a mistake, because Goere differed in no way from Rakossy. He pursued the same kind of policy and was to blame for the past just as much as Rakossy was.

Well, comrades, what could we do? We saw that things were not going as they should. When we were in crimea, Goere "happened" to be there and we "accidentally" met with him. We talked with him. Goere denounced the earlier policy in Hungary and said that it had been a mistaken one, that they had slandered Yugoslavia, and in short he heaped ashes on his head and asked that good relations should be established, promising that all previous errors would be rectified and that the old policy would never be adopted again. We wanted to prove that we were not vengeful, that we were not narrow-minded, and so we agreed to have talks with Goere and a delegation of the PMY (Party of Hungarian Workers) which was to come to Yugoslavia. We wanted to establish relations with the Party of Hungarian Workers, because we hoped that by not isolating the Hungarian party we could more easily influence that country's proper internal development.

However, matters had already gone pretty far, a fact which we did not know, so that Goere's visit to Yugoslavia and our joint declaration were of no avail. People in Hungary were absolutely against the stalinist elements who were still in power, they demanded their removal and the adoption of a policy of democratization. When the Hungarian delegation headed by Goere returned to their country from Yugoslavia, Goere, finding himself in a difficult situation, again demonstrated his earlier self. He called the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who at that stage were still only demonstrators, "mob" and insulted nearly the whole nation. Just imagine how great his blindness was and what kind of a leader he was. In such a critical moment, when all was in a turmoil and when the whole nation was dissatisfied, he dared to fling the term "mob" at the people among whom a huge number, perhaps even the majority, consisted of communists and youth. This was enough to set fire to the keg of powder and to bring about the explosion. Thus the conflict ensued.

### IT IS A GRAVE ERROR TO CALL UPON FOREIGN TROOPS TO TEACH ONE'S PEOPLE A LESSON

There is no point now in investigating who fired the first shot. The army was called out by Goere. It was a fatal mistake to call the Soviet army at a time when the demonstrations were still in progress. To call upon the army of another country to teach a lesson to the people of one's own country, is a serious mistake. That action had the effect of still further enraging the people and that was why there came about a spontaneous uprising in which the Communists found themselves, even against their will, alongside various reactionary elements. Reactionary elements got mixed up

in this uprising and exploited it for their own ends. Are there not plenty of Horthy-ites there? Who has re-educated them? Could Rakossy be expected to have re-educated them? We all know that Horthy had large fascist forces in Hungary, those "swastika crosses", various other reactionary elements, the adherents of Ferenc Nagy, etc. In short, there was a large number of people who are not for communism, who are not only against Rakossy but against socialism in general. And all this got mixed up in the uprising. These reactionary forces did not dare to raise their heads earlier, regardless of all the calls to insurrection from outside, regardless of the aid which they got from abroad, nor did they have the strength or the courage to rise as long as they thought that the party was united and monolithic. But as soon as they saw that the party had split and that a huge section of the party membership had risen against the Rakossy's clique and the remnants of the past, they immediately intervened.

These reactionary forces very quickly, within two or three days, revealed their true face. As in the general people's revolt against things that had been done in the past, the prevailing leadership showed no desire to remove the elements who had enraged the Hungarian people and to start out along a truly Hungarian path of development of socialism, with all its internal specific aspects. Matters quickly took a different turn and the reactionaries began dominating more and more. The justified revolt and uprising against a clique turned into an uprising of the whole nation against socialism and against the Soviet Union. And the communists who were in the ranks of the rebels, willy-nilly, found themselves in a struggle not for socialism but for a return to the past, as soon as the reactionaries took matters into their own hands. Against their own will the communists found themselves in such a situation.

Was it possible now to prevent this? It seems that it was already late. Had Nagy's government been more energetic, had it not wavered this way and that, had it stood firmly against anarchy and the killing of communists by the reactionary elements, had it offered decisive resistance to the reactionaries, etc., perhaps matters would have taken a correct turn and perhaps there would not have been any intervention by the Soviet Army. And what did Nagy do? He called the people to arms against the Soviet army and appealed to the Western countries to intervene.

In the West this intervention was made full use of. It was exploited by the imperialists who could hardly wait to attack Egypt. They attacked it precisely in that phase of the Hungarian tragedy and attacked it, hoping that the Soviet Union would be greatly preoccupied and would not be able to intervene against that aggression. Thus renewed fighting took place in Hungary. Soviet troops were reinforced. Nagy fled and a new government was set up. I can say to you, comrades, that I know these people in the new government and that they, in my opinion, represent that which is most honest in Hungary. They were persecuted under Rakossy. They were in prisons and stand sincerely for a new development. And the very program announced by Kadar, which you have read, proves this. But the Soviet intervention weakens that whole program and the government itself is in a very serious situation.

## ABOUT THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY

The question may now be asked whether the Soviet intervention, coming at the invitation of Goere, was absolutely wrong. The second mistake consisted in the fact that the responsible men, instead of waiting for the second intervention, did not do at once what they did do later on, when the second Soviet intervention took place that is, — they should have set up a new government and issued a declaration. Had they first created a new government and issued such a declaration, the workers and communist elements would probably have separated from the reactionary elements and it would have been easier to find a way out of the critical situation.

Before I refer to the second intervention of the Soviet troops, I must say that the situation in Hungary assumed such proportions — and you have read a great deal about it — that it was clear that there would be a terrible massacre, a terrible civil war, in which socialism could be completely buried and out of which a third

world war could break out. Because, the very interference from the West and the renewed coming to power of the Horthyites and the old reactionaries, could not be tolerated by the Soviet government.

What did these reactionary elements do? I have already stated that very early in the developments they showed their true face. It became clear that even among the top positions they were assuming more and more power as soon as they ordered that the word "comrade" could no longer be used, that the red stars should be taken down. This became clear the moment a communist could not say that he was a communist or else he would be done away with and also by the fact that the communists were being hanged. Had there been only one such incident and had they hanged some member of the police who was known for his ill deeds, it might be said that this occurred as the result of a spontaneous revolt of a group of people. But, there was a general massacre. In Shoprony they hanged 20 communists. They caught people in the streets and killed them if they wore tan shoes because the police wore tan shoes. They broke into homes and killed communists. All this was done by the wild fascist and reactionary mobs.

Nagy's government did nothing to prevent this. It continually wailed over the radio for help instead of fighting against this and showing in some way the will to put a halt to the massacre of the communists and progressive men. Instead of that it issued a manifesto, that is a declaration whereby it renounced the Warsaw Pact, proclaimed its independence, etc. As if that was the most important thing at that moment, as though its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact meant something.

Many people are now asking the question why the second Soviet intervention occurred. It is clear, and we have said so and will continue to say it, that we are against the interference and use of foreign armed forces. What was now the lesser evil? There could be either chaos, civil war, counter-revolution and a new world war, or the intervention of Soviet troops which were there? The former would be a catastrophe and the latter a mistake. And, of course, if that meant to save socialism in Hungary, comrades, we shall be able to say, although we are against the interference, that the Soviet intervention was necessary. But had they done everything they should have done earlier, there would not have been any need for military intervention. This error came unfortunately as a result of their idea that military power resolves everything. And it does not resolve everything. Just look how a bare handed and poorly armed people offers fierce resistance when it has one goal — to free itself and to be independent. It is no longer interested in the kind of independence it will gain, in whether there will be restored a bourgeoisie and reactionary system, but only that it should be nationally independent. It was this idea that prevailed among the people. Naturally, I can now say only that the first thing was the worst that could have happened and the second, the intervention of the Soviet troops, was also bad, but if it leads to the preservation of socialism in Hungary, that is to the further building up of socialism in that country, and to peace in the world, then one day this would become a positive thing, on condition that the Soviet troops withdraw the moment the situation in that country is settled and quiet.

We have said this to the Soviet comrades. We concealed nothing. The Soviet comrades stated that their troops would leave then. In should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union too is in a difficult situation now. Their eyes have been opened now and they realize that not only are Horthyites fighting but also workers in factories and mines, that the whole nation is fighting. Soviet soldiers are not going there with a glad heart. Therein lies the tragedy.

After my report, you can ask questions because I have perhaps not said everything clearly. But you can rest assured that we have never advised them to go ahead with the army. We never gave such advice and could not do so even now that they are in a crisis. In this grave situation we can tell them nothing else except that they should take care to rectify the old mistakes. That is the gist of the matter. Therefore, we should combat those rumours in our country which see in the Soviet



intervention a purely interventionist action. That is not correct. I, comrades, am deeply convinced of this.

I am deeply convinced that the blow which has flooded Hungary and those dreadful sacrifices made by the Hungarian people will have a positive effect and that the comrades in the Soviet Union, and even those Stalinist elements, will realize and comprehend that things cannot be managed thus any longer. It is our tragedy — the tragedy of all of us — that socialism has been dealt such a terrible blow. It has become compromised. And do you not recall, comrades, that we often said that such methods would only compromise socialism? We did say that. I should not want us now to beat our breasts and say gleefully: "We told you so".

#### EVENTS IN HUNGARY WILL PROBABLY BE THE LAST SUCH TRAGEDY

In connection with this tragedy I want to say one thing — that those irresponsible elements in the various communist parties who are still in power by dint of Stalinist methods, represent very poor support to the Soviet Union if they advise it to act according to their ideas. I think that inside all these parties there are honest communists who see much further than these various Stalinists. They do see much further. And if they want the situation to improve there, not in the Hungarian way, but in a peaceful Communist way, then they should criticize the negative things and lend an ear to the voice of the masses, the voice of the party membership and that of the whole nation. Because, if these prophets and advisers continue acting in a destructive manner and if they find it necessary to do nothing but slander our country, to continue flinging mud at us, then, of course, socialism will experience more difficult hours. Yugoslavia stands so firmly on its feet and has up to now withstood so many shocks that these slanders from abroad will not make her deviate from her path. Although we are not as yet fully satisfied with our internal development but will endeavour to make our people as satisfied as possible, nevertheless, such as we are and such as we shall be, we will increase our efforts to prevent such prophets and advisers from succeeding in their intentions which are directed towards halting the process which began in 1948 in Yugoslavia, and is now continuing in Poland, nor will we allow them to divert this process onto Stalinist tracks.

On one occasion I said to the Soviet comrades that this would have happened even if Stalin had not died, that this would have happened even more readily were he alive. They did not deny this. We cannot assume the right to tell them to do things this way or that, we can only point out the mistake and negative results which may be caused by this or that act of theirs. I believe that the events in Hungary will probably be the last tragedy which will jolt the Soviet comrades and leaders in other countries who are still blind to this, into doing everything in their power so as not to have in other countries a situation similar to the current one in Hungary.

In some countries and parties of Eastern Europe certain leaders are saying that this cannot happen in their lands, that they have a strong organization, a strong army, a powerful police force, that their membership is already informed of everything and that they will hold the whole thing firmly in their hands. This was said also by Goere. This was said also by Rakossy. And what does it help them now? Nothing at all if they do not change their methods and if the people rise in revolt one day. What they have sown since 1948 they are now reaping. They sowed the wind and are now reaping the whirlwind. (Long applause).

#### PROSPECTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT AND IMMEDIATE TASKS

These events in Hungary have also stimulated a little the various types and elements who also exist in our country. There are not many of them, but they babble a lot. Some of them indulge in wishful thinking for confusion, in order to profit by it. I never said that we have liquidated and re-educated all the Ustashi, Chetniks and those bigoted Vatican adherents. I always said that only the unity of the people

would prevent them from attempting anything and achieving anything in our country. More than ever, the unity of the people and party is necessary today, but not because we might fear that anything could happen in this country, for Yugoslavia is still something different from Hungary or any other country. We have carried out our revolution through the shedding of our blood, through the Liberation struggle and have thoroughly swept our house during the Revolution. There is no such danger with us.

I shall not say that our people are completely satisfied and that everything in our country is as it should be. Nor am I satisfied myself. But, conditions are quite different in Yugoslavia — there is a perspective in our country and working people in Yugoslavia are increasingly creating. What else displeases me? You will remember comrades, that I made a report last year, in which I pointed out that it is necessary to change the course of our capital investment policy. I profoundly believed that the men who conduct our economy, would take this to heart and that we should really primarily devote attention to the living standard of our people. In this regard a certain turning point has been taken, a certain stabilization in the market has been achieved, and that rapid rise in prices has been halted — the rise which threatened inflation, but all I expected has not been done. We have now decided again to suppress even more energetically the tendency to build and build. We must now see that the living standard is improved and also to strengthen the defence of our country. These two things have priority and we shall see about them. That much I wanted to say about this.

I would now like to say something about the various elements — which exist in our country. They think like this: "Now riots have occurred in Hungary, the Horthyites will come to power there as well as the Vatican and others, and here is a chance for us". In their opinion, Yugoslavia will be again cut off and encircled, and they will be able to act the more easily, in it. There are still such elements but I say that they are very much mistaken. For in our party there are not 800,000 members — as Goere said that the Hungarian party numbered. Upon hearing this I looked at him a little doubtfully — but we have something over 600,000 party members, cadres who have been tempered in the Revolution and in struggle and who have not joined our party with various halfbaked, newly-baked, and other tendencies, but are bearing on their shoulders the burden of the building of our country. They will always know how to prevent in time anybody who might try to undermine our country. We are a country where the League of Communists is in existence with over 600,000 members and 7 million members of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People.

These seven million people are conscious builders of socialism, they have their programme and know what they are aiming at. These seven million people can always have their say, if they see that this can no longer go on, if they consider that we can no longer invest such big funds in capital construction, or if this or that is necessary. Of course nobody has the right, neither I nor the whole of our leadership, to oppose such a desire of our peoples — namely that our country be built at such a rate as it is possible today. You know, comrades, when you are daily confronted with such questions, when you look and see that this or another factory is built, would produce tomorrow such results as to improve the situation immediately, when you see further that only a few millions of capital investments would be necessary to add in order to ensure so much more production, when you only see this, then the other thing — our man — fades away a little. You see only the factory and not the man.

It is clear that we are still in a difficult situation. We have in our foreign trade a large enough imbalance, which is still growing regardless of the fact that during the past year and a half we have concluded rather good agreements, primarily with the Soviet Union for a substantial loan on very favourable conditions, at 2% interest. Secondly, we have concluded an agreement on the payment of reparations by Germany. The Czechoslovaks have written off, that is, equalized 100 million dollars, while debts with Hungary will be settled in keeping with her possibilities. With all these agreements we have facilitated our situation in construction. Finally, we have

got wheat and some raw materials on credit, from America to a value of about 100 million dollars. Our situation is not as difficult as some people wish to represent it. There will be food and bread. In our country the market is a little unorganized as these people are devoting too little attention to see about its being sufficiently well supplied, although very favourable conditions exist for this in the whole country. Take Beograd, for example, the city which has the Pančevački Rit farms in the vicinity and where there are excellent conditions for the growing of vegetables. There are many districts and other communes where huge quantities of consumers goods could be created for the market, but they are not being created. Today for example, vegetables are being transported from Ljubljana to Kopar. What kind of a policy is this since we know that Kopar formerly supplied Trieste. There are a number of such things which are not favourable in our country.

## WE MUST HELP KADAR'S GOVERNMENT

Comrades, I have drawn a little away from the matter of which I have spoken. I wanted to tell you that, viewing the current development in Hungary from the perspective — socialism or counter — revolution — we must defend Kadar's present Government, we must help it. We must help it because it is in a very difficult situation. We must combat all those elements which are now irresponsibly throwing the whole blame on the Russians. Yes, the Soviet comrades bear the responsibility for not having earlier seen and corrected the errors of the Rakossy rule, for not having made possible for those men to come in power in whom the working class and the whole people had confidence. For one cannot impose a leader on a people — that is impossible.

In Poland the situation has become stabilized, but is not too sure. The same elements are acting there too, the elements which are against good relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. It is necessary to take the Polish people away from the reaction which hates not only the USSR but also socialism as such. For the working class and communists in Poland have a broad horizon, a wide outlook and know what support they can get from the Soviet Union. For example without the Soviet Union support, the Poles will hardly be able to defend the Oder-Niese border, which the Germans never recognized and which they will claim again. In a word, what is needed here is mutual help and support.

Similarly, it is necessary that we act in closest contact with Polish Government and to help them as much as we can. Together with the Polish comrades we shall have to fight such tendencies which crop up in various other parties, whether in the Eastern countries or in the West. Comrades, this struggle will be difficult and long, for what is actually involved is whether or not the new trend will triumph in the communist parties — the trend which really began in Yugoslavia and for which a considerable number of elements have been created in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is a question now whether this course will be victorious or whether the Stalinist course will prevail again. Yugoslavia must not concentrate on herself, she must work in all directions, but not by undermining these countries from within, to create negative excesses there, but in the ideological field, through contacts and talks, in order to ensure the victory of the new spirit. One should not abstain from criticising of what is bad in those parties. You have read the article in the BORBA which, in my opinion, is not bad as a first article, but it is not sufficient and this matter must be still written about. It is the duty of you Communists and leaders who work among the people, to explain this matter to our members. I think you agree with my statements. (Prolonged applause).

## ABOUT AGGRESSION ON EGYPT

Now permit me to refer briefly to the aggression which has been carried out in Egypt. You have read about our position in the United Nations and the statement which I gave in connection with that aggression, and you also read our papers. But I



would like to cast a glance at the past. When I met Nasser for the first time, on my return voyage from India, he gave me an exact account of all their difficulties in Egypt, which is an underdeveloped country without industry, with a very low standard of living and without any strong internal organization — a political party on which one could rely. Nasser said that the leaders of Egypt are soldiers who have taken power into their hands to serve their people, to create freedom for it and defend its independence. When he was setting forth all these difficulties, they really seemed to us almost insurmountable. Later, on the second occasion, when we visited Egypt and Cairo, we talked again and saw that these difficulties were enormous. But we observed that the people in that country had begun to awaken, that it had begun to acquire rational consciousness, a people which had previously been oppressed and dormant due to a prolonged occupation and Franco-English colonial actions. We realised that Nasser and his team could rely on the people in the performance of their difficult tasks, on the condition that there should be peace.

In conversation with Nasser, I openly expressed my fears that I hardly believe the imperialists would leave them in peace and that he must take care not to give them least possibility from whatever motive to interfere in the affairs in the Middle East. Of course I could not tell him in detail what he was to do, but I could only indicate the danger which was looming ahead. I told him he should know that the imperialists are men without scruples, that they have not yet renounced their aspirations, that they look upon Egypt, which in that part of the world is the strongest state, as the most dangerous for the imperialist and colonialist possessions in Africa and Asia and that the strong impetus and development of Egypt might tempt the colonial powers to prevent it in its efforts to develop itself. It was our view, and I expressed it in conversation with Nasser, that they should first strengthen within, that they should create an internal political organism, create a strong and firm army, that they should raise themselves economically, endeavouring to get credits wherever they can, and to let the people see something of the new state authority straight away to feel a certain improvement. These were our suggestions and proposals which they readily accepted.

Already during the first meeting Nasser said to us that he would have to nationalize the Suez Canal since Egypt as an independent country, cannot tolerate foreign administration in its own territory. Of course, they have the full right to nationalisation, for which only the right moment had to be chosen. When the nationalization of the Suez Canal was carried out, the great colonial powers England and France reacted sharply, there was a threat of an armed attack to prevent the nationalization. But thanks to the United Nations, this first threat of war was averted. It was decided to conduct negotiations and to see that this problem be settled peacefully. Despite this a sudden aggression was carried out. Egypt was first attacked by Israel, and then by England and France. The whole of this aggression was probably planned jointly, and the moment of attack was chosen when the deplorable event in Hungary took place. The confusion in Hungary was welcomed by them as they had already prepared themselves. England and France used the aggression of Israel as a pretext to say they must safeguard the Suez Canal.

## ISRAEL SHOWED THAT IT WAS AN INSTRUMENT OF GREAT POWERS

This was a typical aggression which does not differ at all from the former classical aggressions of the colonial powers. It is precisely the same. The men who brought about this aggression are repenting today, in my opinion, as they have not succeeded in their action. First, they imagined that they would destroy Egypt in a few days and depose Nasser; second, they thought that such a state of mind reigned in the world, that people would not intervene, and that the United Nations would not condemn them as they would get the majority in that Organization. But they reckoned wrongly. The opposite happened. Egypt was not ruined, although it suffered great losses, its army fought well and the aggressors did not succeed in occupying the whole

of Suez Canal, although they are still fighting. The Egyptian people did not depose Nasser, as Eden expected. In England itself, the Labourites took a very sharp stand against the aggression and the government policy. In the United Nations, the overwhelming majority condemned this act of aggression and the creation of an international police force for Egypt is now under way, and for which we have also offered our own contingent. Namely, the Egyptians themselves have requested this, and we shall probably send our army contingent too.

This time Israel showed that it was an instrument of the great powers and that as such it constitutes a danger for peace. It is true that there exists a terrible revulsion against Israel among the Arabs because nearly a million and a half Arabs have been expelled from that part of the world and these people now live under terribly difficult conditions. Egypt and other Arab countries did not want to conclude peace nor to give a guarantee that they will respect Israel as a State, i. e. they did not recognize it. They still refuse to recognize it, but this does not give Israel the right to begin its aggression. This does not give them such right under any conditions, although the English and others wish to represent it in such a way. Whether the Arabs will recognize Israel, depends a great deal on peaceful talks and persuasion, on the solution of all outstanding problems which have been open since the truce. What is here most tragic, in my opinion, is that the French Socialists have disgraced themselves and shown again that they are faithful servants of those circles which are trying to retain, at all costs, old classical forms of colonialism. They will never wash this stigma from their face. With the aggression on Egypt they wished to settle not only the Algerian question but also to reap benefits in other Near East countries. They believed that this conflict would spread to other Arab countries and that they would thus strengthen their colonial positions. The English thought that after the occupation of the Suez Canal they would have a firmer position in the Near East, that after destroying Egypt, they would ensure their interests in the Middle East. It is tragic that this aggression received the support of the majority of deputies in the French Assembly. Only the Communists and a small part of socialists were against it. This is very tragic.

And this, comrades, compels us to be cautious. For it has turned out that the upholders of the so-called Western democracy. France and England, are for peace, justice and democracy in words, only, while they are actually hotbeds which can lead to extreme reaction and aggressive undertakings if an opportunity presents itself. I am convinced that the unfortunate French people, one day, will have to pay dearly precisely because of this policy which is pursued by the French socialists, headed by Guy Mollet.

We wished to help the French in the Algerian question. We told Nasser that we considered it was difficult for the French to leave Algeria and that it would be a good thing to find a solution in the union between France and Algeria. When we visited France, we said the same thing to the French leaders. "Instead of spending a billion francs every day for the army which you are maintaining in Algeria, give one half of that sum for the improvement of the living standard of those people, for the construction of roads and other projects, and the Algerian people will have nothing against you, will not be against the solution in the form of a union with France. Instead of spending a billion francs a day, and that is thirty billions a month, you had better take that path". Some French leaders admitted this was correct while others said that the prestige of France was in question. There is their prestige for them now! They have disgraced themselves before the whole world. The whole world condemns the act of the the French Government, their act of aggression.

#### YUGOSLAVIA IS VERY ACTIVE AND POSITIVE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Comrades, matters have not yet been cleared, it is not yet clear what they aim at and how far they will go. I doubt that the whole affair with the international police will run smoothly. The English will probably wish that a part of their army should remain in Egypt as police, which is impossible both under the United Nations

Statute and because they are aggressors. They cannot stay in Egypt. Egypt would never agree to this, nor would any honest person. They can always find a motive to resume their aggressive action. They became a little confused and thoughtful because the Soviet Government showed a stronger engagement in this matter.

More than ever before we must direct all our forces towards the preservation of peace. Yugoslavia is very active and is positively operating in the United Nations. On our part we shall do everything in our power for the preservation of peace in the world. The vast majority of peoples do not want war. If anyone in the world values peace, I think it is our peoples who aspire for it in order to be able to build their better life in peace. We have suffered enough, we have shed enough blood in the last and, in previous wars, and we have reason to fight with all our forces for the preservation of peace in the world. But this matter has now passed beyond our boundaries.

Our country is united, firm and monolithic. What is involved is the task to improve the living conditions for our people. Our unity is important for us — this monolithic quality and composure, this viewing of even the most serious events in the world without any nervousness — with calm judgment. We must not permit the babbling of various doubtful elements. The people from below, the masses should silence them and prevent them from sowing discord.

If anything is unclear to you, we are always at your disposal, we can always explain what is involved here. It is clear that there are matters which sometimes cannot be told. You should not think that I said everything today, as I could not do this. But one thing I can tell you, namely, that what I have not told you also has great importance, and that it is in a great measure positive. Yugoslavia today plays a role in the world which is reckoned with. In order that she should continue to play this positive role, I think we must continue the consistent policy which we have pursued till now and preserve the strength which we have today.

This comrades, is what I wanted to tell you. I have briefly set forth, the basic outlines and the most important things which I thought would be useful to you in explaining the issues to our people.



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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS — BELGRADE

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EDVARD KARDELJ'S ADDRESS IN THE FEDERAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

DECEMBER 7, 1956

Considering the speech of Edvard Kardelj, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia to be of exceptional significance, the editors of the "Review of International Affairs" have the honour of submitting it to its readers.

The editors take this opportunity to apologise for the eventual errors of translation, which were inevitable in view of the very short time available for its publication.





Comrades People's Deputies,

In connection with the discussion of topical questions of our economic policy, I would like to call attention to the political aspect of these questions. In the discussion of economic plans, namely, that side of the questions sometimes is forgotten, the development of our political system, the further socialist advance in the relations between men generally. If this mistake were continued, it could have very harmful consequences. On the character of our economic policy there also depends the development of our political system, that is, socialist democracy in our country. And on the progress made in that domain there also depends in the greatest measure the internal stability of our entire society, as well as its unhindered socialist development.

I

As every one is aware, it is impossible to pursue a very strained economic policy which demands very great efforts of the whole people and to simultaneously ensure an uninterrupted advance of democracy in the social and political system. It is clear, for instance, that one cannot speak of a full creative momentum of the Workers' Councils and Communes if their material base has been reduced to a minimum.

It may be that in the past we took too little account of this interdependence of the economic and political factors. We were so impelled by objective difficulties, especially the difficult international position in which we were finding ourselves, and also by the lack of experience of such a young society like ours. Nevertheless, if, after the many experiences, ours and of others, we still were to keep falling into such mistakes, we would not be able to justify them in any way.

In principle and practically, we have fairly long since done away with the Stalinist theses that for the development of socialism it is sufficient to have the Communist Party <sup>hold</sup> power and then "build socialism", through a state political apparatus, that is, erect factories, collectivize agricultural production and determine the wages and salaries to men - the whole in the name of its leading role. To us the concept of the building of socialism means, in both essence and form of movement, far more and something much more complex, a matter that only partly depends on the subjective will of the leading forces. For such concepts, we have been denounced a great deal in the past. However, the recent events in Hungary are yet another warning to anyone who is not prepared to reckon with facts as facts, and who may believe that with the victory of the revolution or the coming into power of some Communist Party the objective social laws cease to operate. On the contrary, they will take vengeance on everyone who attempts to ignore them.

The factual social leading role of a Communist Party cannot be decreed by law. The Party can be really leading, that is, the most progressive social factor, only in case it really acted along the line of objective social laws. And since these laws act through men, through social classes, the Communist Party or any other leading organized socialist force - in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism - must be so laid that through it and equally so through the entire social mechanism there could manifest themselves the most progressive socialist trends and that with the development of socialist relationships it itself also keep changing. If a Party did not perceive this, then it could go on beating its communist chest as hard as it liked and showing off its Marxism-Leninism and invoking its leading historical role; but it would still play the role of a brake on socialist development. It may even become a reactionary force if it continued along this road tenaciously. The notion that the Party, by the mere fact of being called Communist, makes secure the progressive and democratic character of its authority is a grave anti-Marxist error. This has been clearly demonstrated in Hungary. There, an anti-democratic system of bureaucratic despotism had, against the will of the working masses, pursued for years a definite arbitrary policy of a clique. This finally led to armed action in which the main force was the working class, that is, the very class which alone can be the bearer of the socialist transformation of Hungarian society. In this, the most important thing is not as to who all had taken advantage of this revolt ~~of~~ the working class and what were all the slogans by which it strayed when it spontaneously ~~rose~~ against something that socially had become intolerable and reactionary. Far more important is the finding that a political system had in the name of socialism actually become a brake on the further socialist development in such a measure that it had to provoke the working class, that is, the main force of the socialist movement, to armed resistance because this class could not express its will in any other way.

The Hungarian events are a tragedy of the contemporary socialist movement, but equally so and in still greater measure they constitute a lesson and a stimulus for international socialism. They first of all constitute a stimulus for all those socialist aspirations which are expressed in the conceptions that the political system of the socialist state of the transitional period must keep developing in such a way as to enable the most progressive material and spiritual movements of the working masses, whose consciousness is already being formed under conditions of social ownership of the means of production, to daily manifest itself and to act in the direction of an uninterrupted changing of outlived forms. Such is the meaning of the demand for democratization which is today being heard as the chief demand in many countries which are on the road of socialist development.

In a country with a complex inner socialist structure revolutionary political restraints can exist transitionally. But they cannot and must not exist against the free movement of socialist social forces, because then they turn into bureaucratic despotism. Of course, resort to an ever stronger affirmation of the state in the economic and social relationships of a socialist country does not constitute the road towards the complete emancipation of the forces of socialism. One should not forget that there can be no question of some completed socialist system, let alone of Communism for as long as the state as the weapon of coercion is the chief factor in the economic relationships and movements. Socialism must ultimately be freed from bureaucratic brakes so that it could keep developing by its inner impulse and keep waxing stronger and defending itself with the stability and inner strength of the social-economic relationships proper, a higher productivity and the conscious initiative of the broad masses,

organized on the foundations of social ownership of the means of production. Just for this reason too there can be no advance of socialism without the concurrent development of specific forms of democracy corresponding to the socialist economic base.

In our country this principle has - sometimes with more and sometimes with less success - found its application and goes on finding it on an ever wider front. Stalin's onetime criticism of our Communist Party to the effect that it was submerging itself in the People's Front and among the masses had in fact constituted criticism of just such democratic trends in our socialist development. However, while Yugoslav socialism had been gaining in strength thanks precisely to development of these forms of democracy accompanied by a simultaneous opposition to the pseudo-democratic phraseology, which desires to pull society backwards to the outlived political forms, the crisis of Hungarian socialism was provoked just by the absence of every form of democracy.

The events in Hungary provide a highly eloquent illustration of the significance which precisely the clarification of these questions are necessary for the further development of socialism. These events also indicate that for us too one of the indispensable tasks in these times is to keep solving not only the momentary economic questions, but to keep solving these questions in such a way as to ensure a quicker development of our democratic mechanism.

The Communist press is now discussing whether the individual earlier governments, or the political system as such are to blame for the revolutionary events in Hungary. Yet it is clear that the fact of individual mistakes would not in itself have led to such a resolute reaction of the masses providing they had had the opportunity to voice their aspirations for changing the discredited policy of the leadership and thus correcting the mistakes. When the socialist working masses have no opportunity to express their aspirations and correct the leaders' mistakes, then it is clear that the case is precisely one of the existence of a determinate political system which excludes the masses from state authority. A system of that kind must, sooner or later, lead first to the separation of the leadership from the masses, the moment the policy of that leadership came into conflict with the elementary interests of the working masses, and next also to action by those masses against such a political system, which bars their influence from the management of affairs, from social relationships.

It is perfectly clear, therefore, that - when we speak of the political system - we mean neither socialism nor the Leninist Soviet system, which would be so built as to enable the masses to influence the policy of the state and Party. What we do mean in this case by the political system is the aggregate of all those political forms and methods which separate the socialist working masses from direct influence on government authority and which keep strengthening the bureaucratic elements in the Party and the state, delivering to them step by step the individual lovers of state authority, which by this token must degenerate into something different than the state authority of the working class. Just such a process had led to the isolation of the Communist Party in Hungary from the masses and to the absolute autocracy of a bureaucratic clique which had entirely lost the habit of taking account the aspirations and desires of its own working class, and thus of its own people. That which as Marxists we must not forget for a single moment is that in the transitional period bureaucracy in general, and economic technocracy in particular, by its inner logic, necessarily impels society towards such a bureaucratic political system, and once this process -



unless the internal socialist forces opposed it - gains momentum, then it begins to bear not only Staline, but Hungarian happenings also.

The international relation of social forces today is such that the further destiny of socialism is determined not so much through defence of the results achieved - because socialism no longer constitutes a surrounded island - as, and primarily, by its own further development, of socialism itself. Socialist does not stand in need of empty eulogies towards everything that had been accomplished in a socialist country and among socialist countries. On the contrary, what socialism needs is a healthy democratic critical attitude towards its own results, it needs an unquenchable and profound desire for ever better solutions, and in the first place for ever better solutions of the relationships among men. The entire political system of contemporary socialism must be so laid as to enable this tendency and this desire to manifest themselves everywhere. And it is only the eternal movement of the masses that can produce such progressive aspirations. Democracy, therefore, must unconditionally be the constituent element of socialism. Just for this reason socialism indispensably needs discussion, an open Marxist analysis of the Hungarian events.

## II

In the socialist movement two appraisals are now being most frequently heard about the armed uprising in Hungary, both of which, however, are equally wrong and harmful for the further development of socialism in the world. There are those who say that the case is one of a counter-revolution which was organized in advance, in which certain determinate mistakes of the earlier political leadership drew a portion of the masses of people also on the side of the counter-revolution. Others again assert that here it is a question of a revolution for freedom and national independence, in which both the one and the other concept remain abstract, vague, and in the last analysis matters narrow down to the multi-party system of the classical bourgeois democracy as the substance of freedom, and a return to the old positions of Hungarian nationalism by independence.

From the first appraisal the conclusion is being drawn that the counter-revolution must be quelled, determinate mistakes from the past corrected and that thus the problem would be solved, that is, one would be able to resume the old and tested road. Such a view constitutes not only a big mistake, but a big illusion. Such a conclusion may serve to put socialist conscience at rest, but it falls far short of a discernment of the true causes, and thus of the true solutions. Such concepts even shun the fact that after the revolt of the Hungarian working class the point of departure of the further movement of Hungarian socialism was quite different than had been that from 1945. With such an approach matters are not solved, but merely sharpened and the causes, which had led to the Hungarian tragedy are multiplied. If one really wanted to seek out a solution of the present crisis, he would have to seek out and illuminate the true causes of this crisis. The issues of socialism in question are too vital to permit those who truly have socialism at heart to shut their eyes before real facts. Because, if the leading forces in the socialist countries failed to find sufficient strength within themselves to safeguard the evolutionary process of changing of determinate political forms and relationships in a society which had taken the socialist road, then there would be still other political crises. And every such crisis - in the present international conditions - can very seriously endanger not only the individual heritages of socialism, but world peace itself. Socialism is an indispensable gradualness, the evolution of movement. But

that this process be possible, it is necessary that the political system of socialism also be adapted to it. It is for that very reason that we are discussing today the role of the Hungarian political system in the development of the Hungarian crisis.

To the objective Marxist analyst there must occur on the basis of the first appraisal a few quite practical questions to begin with. First of all if it were only a matter of determining "mistakes" of the Rakossy-Goero clique, and not of a bureaucratic system that had started to play a reactionary role towards socialist development, then why is it that the Hungarian working masses were able only through the use of force and arms to oppose the policy which had been producing these "mistakes"? How come that the mood of the Hungarian working class could not manifest itself in a normal way, through adequate representative organs, or at least through the Party of Hungarian Toilers, which was alleged to be the most progressive detachment of the working class, but which was shown to have lost every connection with the working class? Lastly, what kind of comfort is it for socialist conscience when it states that the working class had been misled by counter-revolution - eleven years after its own victory? Even if one assumed this to be true, the question must nevertheless be asked; whether in such a case, one should be breaking the staff over the heads of the <sup>working</sup> class, or over the political system which placed the working class in the absurd position of, allegedly, fighting against its own historical interests?

However, such mistaken logic cannot but lead to the absurd conclusion devoid of any connection whatever with socialism, let alone Marxism, the conclusion, namely, that some Party or state can build socialism without the working class or even against its will.

As a matter of fact, however, the Hungarian working class had nevertheless spontaneously acted in a socialist way. True, in the matter of conception of the state system, of democracy and the political-party relationships, it was in a large measure under the influence of different petty-bourgeois abstractly-liberal phrases, yet at the same time it had solidly placed itself in defence of social ownership of the means of production. Even more, it kept developing this achievement still further through the establishment of Workers' Councils, converting it from a form of state ownership into a consistent form of social ownership, that is, property under the direct democratic management of the community of producers. It is also characteristic that the working masses had declared themselves in favour of unified Workers' Councils and their upward integration, so as to achieve by this means a direct influence on the central state authority. This in itself indicates that the working class of Hungary, notwithstanding its ideological unclarity, into which it had been brought through the collapse of the earlier political system, had nonetheless spontaneously found an essentially correct road to power.

Of course, it is difficult to discuss today whether the Hungarian working class would in the further course of the struggle for power have succeeded in maintaining these positions. There is no doubt whatever that the revamped bourgeois-reactionary forces, which undeniably would increasingly have been sustained from abroad, would have tried to bring their victory to a conclusion. In this respect their course has been clear. In the first phase these reactionary forces had tried to profit by the ideological and political disorientation of the working class to become once again the factor of authority in the country. In this phase these reactionary forces - especially because they were weak - had contented themselves with general phrases about freedom and democracy. But once they had seized power, they would by the logic of things have had to steer towards at least a partial abolition of social ownership of the means of production, and in every case towards limiting the role of and the gradual liquidation of Workers' Councils.

Any party monopoly in the centre - be it a case of one or more parties - is incompatible with the factual decisive role of the working masses through the Workers' Councils in the factories and through the communes. Consequently there is not the slightest doubt but that a new "multi-party system" in Hungary would very soon have clashed with the Workers' Councils, just as now it will clash with every attempt to restore the monopoly of a bureaucratized party.

Therefore, it would be a major mistake and illusion to think that the revolutionary conflicts in Hungary had with the final form of Nagy's government, such as it was before November 4, started onto some normal track. On the contrary, the battle for the final social and political form of Hungary had only then started and, short of those interested in fantasy no one can say how it might have ended. It certainly is more probable that the socialist forces would have succeeded in maintaining the socialist economic base of Hungarian society. But in any case the working class would have had to bleed a great deal more and to suffer very many more disappointments before acquiring through combat and defeats the experiences which would enable it to arrive empirically at a new democratic mechanism of the socialist social system. However, neither could a serious defeat of the working class and socialism be excluded, and thus the conversion of Hungary into the object of a very dangerous international conflict.

It is in this light that we have regarded the second Soviet intervention in Hungary too. In principle we are against foreign interventions, no matter what their point of departure. And this not only because of the right of nations to themselves solve their internal antagonisms, but also because interventions - where it is a case of a social crisis - never solve problems in themselves. They can only postpone their resolving for a determinate time, but they simultaneously make for their sharpening also. In this sense, Soviet intervention in Hungary also can in itself do nothing on the solving of internal antagonisms, but it certainly is going to sharpen matters and conduce to graver consequences, in so far as it becomes a brake in the resolving of the problems of the internal political system which absolutely must be resolved if it is wanted to ensure a healthy development of socialism in Hungary. However, we have also deemed it possible that Soviet intervention in Hungary - which, evidently, was primarily provoked by the existent international conditions - might under determinate circumstances prove the lesser evil in the concrete conditions of Hungary, that is, provided that it cut short further bloodshed, but that it permitted the establishment of such a government and such a policy in Hungary which on the basis of a changed political system would rally all socialist forces and secure to the working class, through Workers' Councils and other similar organs of the working class, that it really obtain that influence on the state policy which it did not possess before. With this, a real point of departure would be laid for the creation of an independent and democratic Hungary which would be capable to defend herself alone from attack by reactionary forces and which could not become the object of international political conflicts. Only such positive consequences could justify Soviet intervention. If no such consequences should derive then the act itself of intervention would also be historically condemned.

Such an attitude of ours now finds itself under double fire. There are those who in the name of proletarian internationalism rebuke us for not extending unqualified support to Soviet intervention. And there are the others who in the name of the principle of non-interference in internal matters and of democracy are rebuking us for not being against this intervention equally without qualification.



However, we consider that now, when Hungarian society is in the throes of such a deep internal crisis, Soviet intervention plays no decisive role at all. This intervention is not the beginning of the sin, it is its aftermath. As a result, it cannot in itself lift Hungarian socialism from the crisis, but can only still more reveal the untenability of the political forms of Hungary from the Rakossy-Goero times.

For the rest, my personal opinion is that the issue of socialism was not the central consideration in connection with Soviet intervention in Hungary, but rather the question of balance of power in the existing international relations. Any more or less realistic observer could have reached the conclusion that in the present international situation it would inevitably come to Soviet intervention when the inner development in Hungary began to create the conditions for intervention from the other side, that is, for the creation of Western political bases in Hungary. A situation of this kind would strongly upset the current balance of power in Europe, provoking very grave upheavals and even threatening peace in Europe. Sundry "free Europe" and similar institutions, and even the sundry nationalistic hotheads in Hungary proper, had been only corroborating such apprehensions. There is no doubt but that even in our own attitude this moment had to play a determinate role, let alone in the attitude of the Soviet government.

Consequently, much as we may be concerned over Soviet intervention in Hungary and its consequences for socialism, we nevertheless consider - in so far as it is a question of socialism - that the destiny of socialism in Eastern Europe today is not being decided by siding with or against Soviet intervention, for the simple reason that this had for the greatest part been conditioned by the existing international situation. The main and decisive question in fact resides elsewhere, in the question, namely: how was it possible that after eleven years of rule by state power which swore by socialism and that in a relatively developed country, with a strong economic base and a strong working class, how did it come to an armed uprising by this same class and that this revolt brought against itself the intervention of another socialist country. Let them christen this process any way they like, a revolution or counter-revolution, but the fact remains that the working class had risen against a state authority which had been proclaiming itself as socialist, and that it had risen in its majority for unless such had been the case, then the uprising would have been nowhere. And it is just as true that even today this working class continues rejecting that which it considers Soviet intervention to imply. And it no doubt considers that this intervention implies restoration of the old system and the old methods. These facts certainly shed a definite light upon the social character of the Rakossy-Goero political system.

Therefore, the cardinal question of today's Hungary occurs just in the fact which today is being most resolutely denied in certain communist parties, and it is that question which today wants discussing: the case is one of the need for radical changes in the political system and not merely changing of men and correcting individual mistakes. And only if this be achieved could the negative consequences of Soviet intervention for socialism essentially be diminished.

Starting from these assumptions, we have deemed it indispensable to extend political support to the Kadar government, expecting or hoping that this government would be capable and that it would want to follow just the course of linking itself with the working class, that is, with the Workers' Councils, as well as other truly democratic and socialist currents in Hungary - including also such elements from the former government of Imre Nagy.

Under such conditions, the government of Janos Kadar could become the starting point of a socialist democratic concentration, leaning primarily on Workers' Councils, and thus lead to the formation of an independent and sufficiently strong democratic but also unconditionally socialist inner force which could restore peace and secure the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Only under such conditions could the Janos Kadar government be the progressive subjective factor in the resolving of the internal social antagonisms in Hungary. In the opposite case, that is, if this government were to diverge from such an orientation— and certain recent developments, in the first place the violation of the Yugoslav-Hungarian agreement concerning the termination of the asylum of Imre Nagy's group and the deportation of this group to Rumania, provide cause for serious concern that such tendencies might be prevailing in Hungary — in such a case even this sole possibility would be ruined, and yet another blow would be delivered to socialism in Hungary. Such a development would cause ordinary bourgeois nationalism to emerge as the principal ideological motive force and the working masses themselves would be thrown still more to the right.

These then are, in our opinion, those cardinal questions which decide the destiny of the further development in Hungary. Only in that light can the role of Soviet intervention be integrally appraised too.

The most surprising thing about the latest Hungarian events is the fear displayed by Hungarian communists of the Workers' Councils. Lenin at one time had the boldness to launch the slogan, "All power to the Soviets," even though the Bolsheviks had no majority in the Soviets. But, as a Marxist, Lenin had rightfully expected that, once they have assumed responsibility for state authority, the working masses would have to act in their own interests, that is, in a socialist mode. And he was not wrong. In Hungary no one had the boldness to raise such a demand, not even the Workers' Councils themselves, which were overly under the influence of petty-bourgeois abstractly-liberalistic slogans. But be they such as they are, these Workers' Councils nevertheless constitute the sole real/socialist force which probably would quickly have recovered from alien, anti-socialist influences if it should have had to assume the principal responsibility for authority both in the factories and local self-governing communities, and in the centre. Since the Hungarian communists did not make such an approach and are not so approaching the Workers' Councils, but perpetually keep agitating that work should be resumed, without reference to authority, it is they themselves who are increasingly pushing them under the influence of the petty-bourgeois and nationalistic, pseudo-democratic elements and phrases.

Such are the facts. To shut one's eyes to them or be mute about them will not benefit socialism, nor the unity of socialist forces. Consequently, the notion of Hungarian events as an organized counter-revolution might perhaps serve some as an artificial means to calm socialist conscience, but what such an appraisal cannot do is to solve the internal problems of a political system, which in Hungary had led to a bloody tragedy.

### III

According to the other appraisal of the Hungarian happenings, everything is utilitarian and progressive that adorns itself with the name of freedom and democracy. On the streets and in different clubs of the intelligentsia, phrasemongers have been vying the soonest to bring these slogans to an anarchistic destructive absurdity, forgetting the while that the cannonade of pseudo-freedom-loving phrases in its practical consequence means nothing but the creating

of chaos in the minds of people, and thereupon being misled by truly counter-revolutionary and quite practical tendencies too, which behind the screen of such phrases had first peddled the classical multi-party system, and their aspirations also for a leading role in power.

I do not assert that a large, perhaps the largest part even, of that intelligentsia which with its ideated influence had predominated in those days in the circles of the Hungarian intelligentsia, and which had mainly acted as the bearer of such a barren abstract liberalism had not subjectively been imbued with sincere democratic and humanistic aspirations and that anti-socialist goals had mainly been alien to it. But in order that someone be capable of leading a revolutionary movement, sincerity, love of freedom and humanism alone would not do him sufficiently, for he must also know what he wants. However, among that decisive part of the intelligentsia which has launched a mass of barren, abstract proclamations and slogans there has occurred no one who would have had the ability and courage to tell the masses that there is no freedom and democracy unless it be backed by a definite relation of social forces, a definite structure, and in revolutionary action a definite real social force as well, and that the cardinal problem of revolution, therefore, is to primarily set up this force, which can only be socialist, following which alone one may really speak of a political system of democracy, of a clear content of democracy. However, the proclamations of the Hungarian intelligentsia did not take due account of these problems. For them there had only existed a world of slogans and illusions, while behind them there was taking place a commotion and regrouping in the real world of the material social forces, in the world of the elementary material and social interests. And it is this world, with all its material and social contradictions, interests and antagonisms, which always decides everything in the final analysis, of course, including even freedom and democracy. Whoever forgets these facts must very soon find himself on a side track. Those circles also of the Hungarian democratic intelligentsia to which we are referring here had very quickly found themselves just on such a side-track. This intelligentsia - regardless of the socialist good will of a large part of its only saw the adverse consequences of the old political mechanism in Hungary, but it failed and was not able to explain the causes, nor to indicate a way out of the situation which would lead to the progress of socialist and democracy. It was not capable of creating, but only kept demolishing. And with this job done, it was caught on the false democratic and nationalistic tradition of the 19th century. This in fact was capitulation. Capitulation before Stalinism and capitulation before the bourgeois order. The admission of its complete own incapacity. But in one thing this intelligentsia nevertheless remained consistent: until the last moment it kept the Workers' Councils isolated from real political power. It kept creating in Hungary or recognizing all sorts of pseudo-revolutionary committees, but at no point did it proclaim the demand that power should be granted, not to the bankrupt parties, not to one of them, and not to many, but to an organism the pivot of which would be the Workers' Councils and self-governing local communities, socialist communes. So, in the general ideological confusion of the Hungarian intelligentsia, there was some consistency after all. And this consistency indicates that the Hungarian intelligentsia also had been acting under the strong ideological influence of bureaucratism, that is, its material and social interests.

In the first phase the Hungarian intelligentsia demanded freedom of Goero, who has long since lost the habit of regarding men as conscious independent beings, and in the second phase it was to look forward to it from the restored bourgeois parties, whose "democratic tradition" from the past is highly familiar too. In neither phase, though, did it know how to point to the true social forces which could indeed act as the bearers of freedom and democracy, to, as I have said, the Workers' Councils, to the communes and other similar forms of socialist democracy.



In an ideological sense, this movement has been hollow, being indeed but a peripheral and deformed echo of the deep movements in the socialist social base. So, ultimately, it narrowed down to a mass of contradictory liberalistic slogans many of which became a phrase and illusion and the others a mask behind which were being peddled sundry anti-socialist programmes. Incapable of doing anything creative at all in the direction of blazing new trails on the socialist terrain, some circles of the Hungarian intelligentsia had finally dragged forth from the historical second-hand shop the old /which was the only thing left them/ bourgeois political machinery and the old Hungarian nationalism. With this, of course, I do not wish to underrate the positive role which progressive intelligentsia played in Hungary at that time. But this does not alter the fact that the influences of bourgeois thinking had nevertheless prevailed ultimately. The tragedy of the Hungarian revolution lies just in the fact that these ideologically barren men had by force of circumstance become its political leadership, since there was, no other leadership at all. But it is even more catastrophic that no other forces and centres of socialist consciousness were found in Hungary which could have offered to the Hungarian working class some other alternative, and not merely a return backwards to the positions of the bourgeois political system or to Stalinism.

Under such conditions, the working class had acted spontaneously, yet this class was the sole force which acted in a socialist and truly democratic manner by creating Workers' Councils with the tendency of their integration into a unified national system. With this the Hungarian working class had done everything it could within the framework of direct practice.

In its more or less spontaneous action there nevertheless has been clearly mirrored the trend to have the working class, in the form of Workers' Councils and their unification, organize itself as the state. These tendencies and trends had been springing spontaneously from both the direct interests of the workers and the needs of Hungarian society, founded on the socialized means of production. This in effect had constituted the only possible socialist solution of the inner crisis of Hungarian society.

Regrettably, this process did not run its full course. The chief reason certainly being that it had lacked a conscious orientation and clear aim. There had existed no elaborate conception of the revival of Hungarian socialism through surrender of political power to the Workers' Councils, with isolation of reactionary and political factors, whether Stalinist or bourgeois, that had assembled themselves behind the back of petty-bourgeois anarchism and pseudo-liberalism. In addition, on this healthy socialist mechanism of the working class there had been exerted a fierce political material and ideological pressure both from the bearers of the bourgeois-democratic illusions, who were hindered by the Workers' Councils as a political form which ensured the leading role of the working class and socialist forces, and the pressure from the Stalinist elements and dogmas to which the Workers' Councils stood as a threat to restrain the monopoly of the ruling party.

One can, therefore, say without exaggeration that the total absence of any serious influential revolutionary and realistic socialist subjective factor, which knew how to mobilize and lead the working class on the programme of socialism and socialist democracy into a struggle for power through the Workers' Councils and other organs of self-government of the working people, has represented the main characteristic of the spontaneous revolt of the working people in Hungary.

The question arises how was it possible for Hungarian socialism to suffer such a grave ideological collapse.

The Hungarian revolutionary clashes in fact provide the first larger example of violent settling of accounts with those barriers to the further development of socialism which already are the product of a petrified bureaucratic system and which in determinate conditions are a legitimate social phenomena in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. New socialist democratic forms and ideas are only at their beginning, and experiences are few, while social development itself indispensably calls for quicker progress in the sphere of both political system and ideological life. Besides, such progress is being resisted by the material and ideological conservatism of a system leaning on rich revolutionary traditions from the past. Due to all this, in the social upheavals and movements such are now occurring in Hungary, it can come to the domination of the unconscious spontaneous revolt which is basically healthy but which in the further development can provoke vast destruction and ideological and political confusion the moment it remains without determined ideological centres and generally subjective factors of leadership. And there where blind forces predominate in revolutionary events, illusions simultaneously hold away, while practical action keeps pulling backwards towards some familiar old, but now again idealized forms. In other words, men who at the moment of confusion in a forest are unable to find their way forward, first start to turn back and then even to run back regardless of the fact that the matter they had started on is thereby being dragged into a catastrophe.

The same thing happened in Hungary. The former Rakossy-Geroesque regimes and generally the ruling Stalinist dogmas had not only accumulated a mountain of social antagonisms, but had left behind them a barren wilderness in the heads of the fighters for socialism. In this bureaucratic system, a huge mass of sincere revolutionaries and socialist fighters had been educated in the concept that following the victory of the revolution nothing else is left to the subjective factors but to build factories, to make ceaseless capital investments, to safeguard the system of obligatory deliveries of agrarian products to the state, to agitate for all government measures, to acquire as many surpluses and resources out of the economy as possible so that as much as possible could be invested in new construction and maximum planned figures achieved. In such a system it was incumbent upon every state functionary and party official to know by heart at all times all possible data regarding the condition in the economy, data which very often are of very little importance. But no one had been able, nor did he feel any particular need to be able, to see or explain what was taking place among the people, what social processes were unfolding, what new social forces were being born, what forces were withering away, what antagonisms were appearing and in what forms, where were tendencies of degeneration manifesting themselves, where was socialist progress calling for abolition of the old, etc., so that the economic policy too could be adapted to these indices. However, policies had disappeared there, only discussion remaining about planned figures, about the output of steel and machinery, about potatoes and maize, about the methods of livestock nutrition, etc. Of course, I am far from denying the also indispensability of such discussions, especially among specialists, but once things become reduced to them only, then it is symptom that things are going wrong. It cannot nor must it be the task of the central social and political organs of a socialist country to prescribe to people how they are to feed livestock. Of course, they should ensure the existence of specialized organizations which at every moment would be able to give to those interested every possible skilled, technical and material assistance. But the main task of those central organs unquestionably must be to ensure through the political, economic mechanism of society and at every moment the maximum material and moral stimulation of every individual at his socialist working post so that he should produce the most and the best, as well as his due independence so that he could comprehensively develop his creative energies and initiative. This must be our

principal aim in the construction of the social mechanism, if we are talking of socialist construction and if wish to ensure that the socialist social system should depend in its development on the free action of socialist working people, not on state compulsion.

We have always been stressing that the construction of socialism - in so far as we use this unprecise and propagandist term, the construction of socialism, to designate certain conscious actions of men in the direction of development of socialist relationships - does not constitute the same process as the construction of a house. It is not a task that could be managed and guided from a bureaucratic office. Construction of socialism is an organic social process wherein the leading force should only strive for the release of socialist forces and the protection of these forces from the intervention of different non-socialist factors.

Acting within this process are diversified social forces, starting from the remnants of the past to the transitional new creations, such as technocracy and bureaucratism, for example; which can become a serious social force indeed. Even the working class itself is undergoing a change in the process of socialist development. The inner relationships are changing in which it lives, and its consciousness is changing too. To conceive of the process of socialist development exclusively through the prism of the starting point of the socialist revolution, that is, through the class conflict of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is absurd in the ideological sense, and reactionary in the political one. From such an outlook there issues a perpetual and automatic glorifying of everything that exists in the countries where communist parties are in power. As though all these social problems had been solved for all time, or as though all these questions could nicely and by decree be solved and as though everybody could snugly wait until some office of the centralized administrative apparatus would consider that the time has come to solve this or that question. According to this idealist scheme, which unfortunately is not merely a caricature, but a living reality, it would seem as if in the transitional period both the positive and negative products of social development were not incessantly and recurrently emerging day after day.

It is extremely erroneous to reduce discussion of the problems of social development of the transitional period exclusively to the remnants of the overthrown bourgeoisie. After ten years of development of socialism in a somewhat developed country, such remnants ought to represent a factor of lesser political significance. The mechanism of a state of the transitional period breeds also other factors of much greater moment and in which are entrenching themselves in a new form the historically reactionary forces opposed to the progress of socialism. Here, in the first place, as we all know, comes bureaucracy, which appears in both the Stalinist and bourgeois-democratic form. Bourgeois counter-revolutions can in general be a serious political factor only under the conditions when bureaucratic despotism had reached such a measure of antagonism towards the needs of further socialist development that it stirs up the working class and provokes it to attack against such bureaucracy. One should not forget that the French counter-revolution did not win due to its own inner strength, but only after the Jacobinic terror had come to completely contradict the actual needs and possibilities of social development in the then France. And even after the counter-revolution had formally won, it could not cancel the revolutionary achievements which were of essence for the further development of capitalism. Nevertheless, a whole series of consecutive revolutionary conflicts were needed after that to gradually cleanse the political system of those elements which were hindering a quicker social development.



The absence of every more serious analysis of the social processes in the transitional period, more than that, the barring under the threat of death of every discussion of social relationships and social questions which opposed the fiction that a society constructing socialism had no reactionary and conservative elements beyond the remnants of the bourgeoisie - such had been the characteristic of the Rakossy Hungary. According to this teaching, social development is identical with the policy of the government, for which reason the government should have absolute power. According to such a conception, the sole task of the men consciously desiring to make a contribution to socialism was to popularize and "explain" the measures of the government. The same task also fell to sociology. The entire ideological work, therefore, was devoid of every creative impulse, being reduced to the miserable status of a servant maid to practice without principles.

The question arises what kind of socialist cadres could have been raised by such a system and what possibility did this system give to the spontaneous socialist forces to correct the policy of the so-called leading forces; and generally, how could the socialist consciousness of the working people be formed under such conditions which, after all, should be the foundation of stability of the whole social system? Of course, in the above designated conditions, the answers to all these questions can only be through and through in the negative. In effect, the political system itself and the Party itself, which by its status should have been the most progressive force in the country, had barred the possibility for the emergence of cadres that could have expressed and borne the progressive socialist tendencies in Hungary. With this the break between the masses and the leadership of the Hungarian Party of Toilers had become complete, and the Hungarian working class become ideologically disarmed and left to all kinds of ideological influences from the side.

Only to such an abnormal conditions it is to be ascribed that a Petoefi Club, with a meddley of dissimilar elements of the intelligentsia, from very progressive and socialist to petty-bourgeois-anarchist and confused to openly reactionary and anti-socialist, could have become first of all the safety valve of the stifled energies of the masses and subsequently one of their main ideological and political centres of orientation. This abnormal political form and affirmation alone of such an ideologically heterogeneous debating club as the main ideological force of a socialist revolt is indicative of all barren desert of ideas which the bureaucratic system of Rakossy and Goero had left behind them.



It is in such an ideological atmosphere that the Hungarian Workers' Councils too had been developing. As we saw, they had been opposed by both the Rakossy-Stalinist elements and petty-bourgeois liberalism. They were not understood by the Communists either who condemned the Rakossy-Coero regime and separated themselves from it. For part of them, the part which under the influence already of the old Stalinist dogmas had become accustomed not to have faith in the masses, into the socialist consciousness of the working class and in the material indispensability of the working class to act in a socialist way, it was inconceivable that the working masses could directly, not through the Party exclusively, or through its leadership, participate and decide in the system of state authority. The Party of Hungarian Toilers, which for ten years ruled through a purely bureaucratic political and economic apparatus, had disappeared and, by this simple fact, it could not be a real socialist factor. But even so its leaders merely changed the party's name in their attempt to convince the Hungarian workers that the problem was solved thereby. However, the Hungarian workers had risen against the bureaucratic system and not against this or that name of a party which had built up such a system. Instead of making fruitless efforts along the line of restoring the Communist and other political parties to power, the progressive socialist forces in Hungary, during those revolutionary days, should in fact have fought for the victory of the principles of direct democracy through the affirmation of unified Workers' Councils and self-governing communes as the mainstay of the new socialist state authority, because only in such democratic organs could the socialist forces have again experienced their own renaissance, to become reborn once more as a first-class political force in such organs of the revolution. However, the Hungarian Communists were all too encumbered with petrified dogmas of the past to be capable of such a radical turn and, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, it is true that the Communists had decided to pass to the classical bourgeois multi-party system even if this should have meant to leave Hungary to reactionary forces rather than renounce the illusion about their own mass party, which the masses already had left because a party of such a type was to them the personification of bureaucratic despotism. In those days Hungary was in dire need of progressive fighters for socialism, but not of the Stalinist type and not organized in the old type political party, no matter under what new name it was coming forward. They should have been there where the working class was, namely within the ranks of the working class itself, and

- 15 -

for such merging with the working class they should have sought new forms of organization and new working methods too.

Since this thought had been alien to the leading Hungarian Communists and since they could never manage to escape out of the old patterns, after the initial separation of the most diehard Stalinists they again had to split up. One part of them were taken in by the false liberal slogans and the idealizing of the bourgeois-democratic system and they started to espouse the building of a parallel state authority alongside the Workers' Councils and, in the last analysis, against the Workers' Councils, because these two forms cannot be reconciled. Let us leave aside that in such an acuteness of social antagonisms as have reigned in Hungary the hope in some classical peaceful multi-party democracy had been a mere illusion, which the further course of sharpening internal antagonisms would probably very soon have destroyed. But even if that were not so, the question arises why did the Communists, at the price of fiction about their mass Party, which they had no more, renounce the real force of the working class and socialism which was incarnated in the Workers' Councils and which might have become the mainstay of the new political mechanism of Hungarian socialist democracy as direct democracy. This is the only language the Hungarian workers would probably have understood at that moment. But they could not understand their being inveigled again back into a party which already had suffered a terrific shipwreck just because neither the direct influence of the working class nor the true Marxist, communist idea had not been coming to the fore in it. On what grounds could the workers have been expected to believe that the old evil would not repeat itself? Simply on the basis of a change of leading men? Never. It is the political system which wanted changing, not merely men and the names of organizations.

Another part of well-meaning Communists became fearful of such a development of matters in which the forces of bourgeois restoration were indeed gaining increasing sway. The same fear had also paralyzed and passivized a large part of the working class which in Nagy's government no longer saw a perspective for itself and at the same time feared a return to the old - the Stalinist. Thus it came to the separation of a part of the Communists from the Nagy government, either through passivity or through seeking safety in the Soviet Army. For these Communists, too, the revolutionary Workers' Councils were an alien mechanism allegedly threatening the position of the Communist Party in the mechanism of state authority and which, therefore, could not be the point of departure for the construction of a new socialist political system. The inevitable product of such a state of affairs subsequently was Soviet intervention and the formation of the Janos Kadar government.



In view of this whole trend of events in Hungary, it had been clear in advance that Soviet intervention would inevitably come at the moment when Hungary became the arena for intervention from the other side also, and it did start becoming this from the moment when the old Rakossyan political mechanism, instead of being replaced by a real progressive socialist mechanism, began to be replaced by the old and in the Hungarian conditions untenable mechanism of the bourgeois state, that is, a state built on private ownership of the means of production. Such a Hungary would not be an independent Hungary. Such a Hungary would have begun to upset the balance of power which had been established in Europe and with this it would have had to provoke a sharpening of the clash of the antagonistic international forces.

Of course, since not a single more serious Communist faction had at any point been capable of formulating, nor did it even attempt to formulate, a clear and definite platform regarding the role, tasks and aims of the Workers' Councils as the mainstay of the revived political mechanism of Hungarian socialism, the Workers Councils themselves in time also fell increasingly under the influence of different pseudo-democratic slogans, which in essence were aimed at separating the Workers' Councils from state authority and reduce them to the mere role of some political-trade-union representative of the workers within the state mechanism which was being built beyond and independently from the Workers' Councils. Neither could that Hungarian intelligentsia which in the first days indubitably had very sincerely and progressively proceeded against the Rakossyan system, discharge this decisive positive role in the Workers Councils having instead very often disorientated the working class through its own lack of orientation. Due to the fact that it was incapable of proposing something other than a resumption of the old political bourgeois mechanism as substitute for the Rakossy regime, this intelligentsia had pushed the Workers Councils to the side, depriving them of every perspective and frequently converting them simply into staffs for the conduct of practical resistance while increasingly leaving the formulation of the political programme in the name of democracy to reactionary forces.

Here, in these factors, then, should be sought the causes of the Hungarian tragedy, as well as the causes of the defeat of democratic trends in this uprising. By this I do not mean to say, however, that the progressive tendencies which contributed to the uprising had also suffered defeat. With time perhaps, based on their own experience and in an imposed struggle against reactionary forces, there might have arisen and developed in the Workers Councils a clearer concept of the synthesis of socialist and democratic aspirations. But the events have moved more quickly than the process of the formation of the new consciousness, with the result that the whole system of Workers Councils also remained uncompleted and paralyzed.

In addition, one should bear in mind that the experiences of the progressive socialist forces in coping with bureaucracy are still very modest and still far from allowing definite democratic political forms to be drawn from them in a final form. Up to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia actually had been the only one to make a more serious quest for and also found certain political solutions for the contradiction of the transitional period, having done so by building up the mechanism of self-government of the working people in all domains of social life and thereby freeing society from the political forms and methods with which bureaucratic elements are seeking to rivet the whole society down into stagnation. Of course, none of us claims that what we have done was the only possible thing and the best for everyone, as they have been accusing us of late from all sides. That which we do claim - and which comrade Tito has also claimed in his recent speech at Pula, which has drawn considerable denunciations - is only the fact that Yugoslav socialism has been the first to embark on a radical squaring of accounts with bureaucracy as a social force through a gradual changing of its political system and that this task cannot be bypassed by any socialist country, providing it desired to clear the path to unhindered development of socialist and democratic relationships among men. (Applause.) Of course, every country will itself be determining this path for itself. Consequently, only life and the further development, through successes and failures, can give to the most progressive social forces in socialist countries the necessary experiences and the necessary theoretical conclusions which would make it possible for the further forward movement of socialism to be ever more forceful under the influence of the progressive socialist consciousness. And this will create the indispensable precondition to avoid, in the future, the bloody events and crises such as broke out in Hungary and to ensure that the advance of socialism and democracy really proceed by constant progressive evolution, not through grave social convulsions.

If this be true, then it is clear that we have no right to close our eyes before the burning problems of contemporary socialism, neither we nor anybody else who claims to have socialism at heart. A man does not have to be a Marxist to know that the events in Hungary are not accidental, or that they have not been the consequence of those several hundred million American dollars which were spent on anti-Communist propaganda. Such things are being reiterated by those Tory-conservative men in the Communist movements who find comfort in such things and who would like to ostrichwise stick their head in the sand and thus wait for the unpleasant days to blow over. They are deceiving themselves, of course. The unpleasant days are not going to blow



over so easily, because they have their deep causes. And these are sure to go repeating themselves if the individual Communist parties are going to persist in deceiving their own selves and that part of the masses who follow them.

At all events, it is our historical duty as Marxists that, without any faltering, prejudices and fear or favour whatever, we look facts into the face. Thorough work is necessary first of all on a deep analysis of the causes that led to the uprising in Hungary, and to similar phenomena in Eastern Europe, and on drawing conclusions which would help the socialist forces to emancipate themselves more quickly and more fundamentally from the patrimony of the Stalinist despotism. It is also necessary, on the basis of hitherto existing experiences, to draw some general conclusions also regarding the mechanism of movement of social forces in the transitional period for here precisely determinate theories of Stalin's and their imposed application in different socialist countries had wrought most damage. A constructive, comradely, socialist discussion should only contribute to the measure that would prevent the repetition of such elemental processes as have taken place in Hungary. This is all the more necessary since the Hungarian tragedy provides eloquent testimony that such happenings constitute not only a blow to socialism, but a danger to peace in Europe and in the world. And for the further progress of socialism and socialist democracy, peace is necessary above all else.

I do not propose to dwell on the perspectives of the further developments in Hungary. Evidently the current measures in Hungary will be possible of historical justification, to some extent at least, on the sole condition that the political and social relationships in Hungary were at least subsequently to go developing in the sense of what I have said before. If, however, the tendencies to restore the old political system should gain the upper hand, even if with less brutality, then the problem will not have been solved and history and the Hungarian working people will sooner or later condemn the present political action of the decisive factors in Hungary, both those in power and those in opposition, in as far as they failed to find in this crucial moment the road to unity on the basis of socialism, socialist democracy and independence.

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Within the framework of this discussion of ours, I had only desired to indicate mainly those aspects of the events in Hungary which can serve us as further experience in our own political building up and which confirm the correctness of the principles on which we have been seeking to further develop our social and democratic political mechanism. After all, the Hungarian events indicate to us the full seriousness for the solving problems of this kind, as well as the need that we move forward more boldly. Although we already have accomplished something, it is clear that we must never be contented. The question of the standard of living, which we must keep solving successively in the years ahead, is not the only one. We must proceed further in the development also of our political system, in the construction of the mechanism of socialist democracy, in the further democratization of the individual domains of our social life. This is not a need of ours only, it is the need of socialism at large. And of this we absolutely must take account in determining our economic policy.

The Hungarian events provide repeated evidence of how right we were when we resolutely resisted as we did both the pressures of Stalinist conceptions and the attempts, under the guise of the need for political liberalization, to restore in Yugoslavia the political forms of classical bourgeois democracy. Both the one and the other tendency pulls a society backwards which arose out of a socialist revolution, and would contribute to an accumulation of inner antagonisms, and even temporary paralyzing of the forces of socialist progress. Obviously the political forms of socialism must grow organically out its own social-economic foundations, that is, out of the economic relationships and interests originating on the basis of social ownership of the means of production. More than ever before it is necessary today to make the most intensive creative efforts in the direction of further development of these new social and political forms, which make secure the free movement of socialist material and social forces. And this also includes the widest initiative of individuals in their efforts to adjust their personal and social life to their material and moral-political interests springing from their work with social means of production.

These new forms, of course, cannot simply be fabricated in one's head and imposed upon society. They must be born, and indeed they are being born incessantly of social contradictions proper which are inherent in the development of society at the transition from capitalism

to socialism, that is, of the needs themselves of social and economic progress.

The political system of socialism must be built up in such a way that the working class and other working people have a direct influence on it and not only through some ruling party which is susceptible to bureaucratization. New political forms can normally keep emerging and developing sobely under the conditions when the progressive aspirations of the working masses, which are growing parallel with development of the material base of socialism and the affirmation of socialist relationships, truly can come to an expression in the corresponding democratic organs of social and state government. Just for this reason, there is no socialist progress without constant advance of democracy in all social relationships, of course, as we have said, a democratic process that corresponds to the movement and action of socialist economic and social-political factors. This alone is the course which makes possible the gradual elimination of the elements of bureaucracy from social relationships such as arise in the transitional period on the basis of social ownership of the means of production.

These are the basic presumptions from which we began in the development of our socialist democracy. We have been learning from experience, we have made use of many a thing from democratic traditions of the past, but we did not move backwards and have also sought to extract fitting new democratic forms from the new social relationships.

This process is not nor must it depend exclusively on conscious action from the top leadership. On the contrary, the political mechanism of socialist society should grow organically from those fundamental social-economic relationships which arise in production on the basis of social ownership of the means of production. In the socialist system man must not become the slave of the prevailing state apparatus under the pretext of some higher interests. The political system of capitalism achieved its stabilization only after it had definitively consolidated the status of the private owner over the means of production and when it had completely freed him as such from the willfulness of the feudal lords, the bureaucratic apparatus of the absolute monarchy, as well as the arbitrariness of the clerks of the Jacobin dictatorship. Only from this basic cell of private ownership, was it possible for the stable system of bourgeois democracy to gradually develop.



While I am reluctant to make mechanical analogies, the above example nevertheless confirms our thesis that, for the development of a stable democratic political mechanism of the state of the transitional period, it is first of all indispensable to consolidate the economic and social relationships within the social base and render them independent from the everyday policy of the state apparatus. And this, before all else, means that it is necessary to consolidate the economic and political status, first, of the individual working man in his work within the social means of production, second, of the working collective in the enterprise, and third, of the local self-governing community, which should grow gradually and increasingly into a community of socialist producers. In such a community there should be effected the basic solving of the contradictions between the collective and the individual interests, and by that very fact the emancipation of labour too, that is, the transformation of every worker into a free creator in his own material and moral interest, and simultaneously in interest of the social community as well.

This is the sole way too for the working man - the producer - to be able to grow simultaneously into a responsible social worker. It was Marx who demanded that "the partial individual, the mere bearer of a social detailed function" - meaning the status of the worker in the capitalist division of work - "be replaced by a totally developed individual for whom the different social functions mean as many alternate modes of activity." (Marx: The Capital).

It seems to me that many in the various socialist movements who otherwise are fond of invoking Marx have forgotten these concepts of Marx's. They have also forgotten the following premise of Marx's:

"The commune had wanted to make individual ownership into a reality by converting the means of production, land and capital, which now primarily represent means for the oppression and exploitation of labour, into the mere implements of a free and united labour...

K. Marx: "Civil War in France," p. 68. (Published by "Kultura".)

For, had they not forgotten this they would not be treating the relationship between the individual and the collective interests in the sense of an absolute subordination of the individual interests to the



"higher interests" under the name of "collective interests" - (which in actual fact no longer is a collective interest the moment the individual has been excluded from it) - but as a unity of contradictions, which constitutes one of the basic laws of socialist material and social development. To bring pressure upon the action of this law through centralized bureaucratic state mechanism actually means to divert society onto the road of stagnation and deformation. To open the road for the free action of the laws of social development through a fitting mechanism of Socialist democracy means to ensure a constant evolutive resolving of the above mentioned contradiction, and thus constant progress of socialism too. It stands to reason that this process cannot proceed rectilinearly and without disturbance and difficulties, because human consciousness does not always coincide with the material conditions. But this does not mean that a progressive socialist movement may renounce this principle, which in the last analysis is dominant after all.

It is in this light that we should also regard the characteristic of social ownership of the means of production. In Stalinist theory there predominates the concept that state and social ownership are identical concepts in a socialist country. This theory corresponds to bureaucratic conceptions of the role of the state.

The product of a factory which is social property, under conditions of socialism, cannot be treated as state property, that is, as property which is managed by some organs beyond the direct influence of the worker, the producer, who had participated in its production. It represents the unity of the contradictory relationship between collective social property and the individual property of the producer. To separate these two elements from one another would connote either the turning of the worker into the slave of a state-capitalist system or abolition of social ownership of the means of production. A peaceful and progressive solving of these contradictions is only possible on condition, first, that the working collective itself managed the enterprise, on the basis of a democratically enacted over-all economic plan, which should secure a harmonious development of the economy, and second, that within the framework of the commune, and through the last in the higher organs too, directly influenced the basic distribution also of the surpluses created in the enterprises. The concept of social ownership of the means of production, therefore, absolutely comprises the indispensability of determinate material and action independence and thus the instability



also of the social economic base. Of course, mutual social interests demand adequate higher organs too and special funds, as well as a series of centralized functions, but their rights and scope must keep adapting themselves to the movements and socialist interests at the social base.

However, state ownership in the narrower sense of the word of objects other than the means of production is, of course, another thing.

Of course, it is not only some theoretical conclusions which are directing us in such a direction, and I am not dealing with this because of the theoretical aspect of these questions. Our whole practice speaks that the insufficient stability of the material and legal status of our basic social factors, of individuals working on the social means of production, of enterprises and the commune and district is the source of a series of processes which not only are inflicting political harm, but frequently and directly act as a brake on the development of the productive forces of our country and fetter the working and social initiative of the individual. After all, the whole discussion too here in the Assembly in the last few days has primarily revolved around the consequences of this main weakness of ours.

It seems to me that the problems and tasks stemming from these facts are the most important thing which - over and above the further efforts on closing the basic material disproportions - we should take into account in determining our future economic policy.

To be sure, in this respect we have done more than any other country on the socialist road. But only then when we had done something practically was it revealed how significant that problem was and how much more must be done to establish such stable relationships down in the foundation which the materially and politically interested men, not the administrative power of the state, would themselves be able to defend and wish to defend.

Consequently, our prime task was, and today in particular remains, this too, to consolidate the status of those basic social factors of which I have spoken, and from this base - with the activity of all conscious socialist factors - will then develop and grow the independent socialist forces and forms which would correspond to the most progressive aspirations of society and which would in due course, and consistently with the developing of the material base and socialist relationships, keep eliminating from our social and political



mechanism the elements of the old, whether bourgeois-legal or bureaucratic, which inevitably still exist in our system. For this path we must fight perseveringly not only for our sake, but for that of socialism at large. The successes along that road will be our contribution to the solving of the transitional crisis in which international socialism finds itself. And it does not find itself in this crisis because it is incapable of survival or because social forces are pulling it backward. It had grown mature to march forward, but has run into brakes which are fettering its further progress.

We are not appropriating for ourselves any monopoly<sup>of ideas</sup>, as we have been accused of late from some quarters. But we are conscious that our socialist practice, our endeavours towards the further development of socialist relationships and socialist democracy can be a real contribution to the strength of international socialism.